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CONTENTS

3 March 1993

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Macedonian Daily Interviews Bulgarian President [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 5 Feb]	1
---	---

BULGARIA

* Former Intelligence Chief Petkov Interviewed [168 CHASA 18 Jan]	5
---	---

HUNGARY

* Mass Dismissals on Ethnic Grounds Charged [SZABAD UJSAG 27 Jan]	8
* Budapest Deputies Discuss Komarno University [UJ SZO 23 Jan]	8

ROMANIA

* UDMR Congress Speech: No Foreign Funds Received [Budapest BESZELO 23 Jan]	10
Implications of Recent UDMR Congress Analyzed [BARICADA 25 Jan]	10
* Liberal Rusu's Speech to UDMR Congress [ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO 20 Jan]	11
Legal Action Against Former Dissident Discussed [BARICADA 2 Feb]	13
Charges Against Archbishop Vornicescu, Removal Urged [BARICADA 21 Jan]	14
Controversial Cluj Mayor Defended as 'Great Patriot' [EUROPA 18-25 Jan]	17
Commentary on CADA Founding Members' Press Conference [BARICADA 26 Jan]	18
Timis Commander on Arms Reductions, Preparedness [RENASTEREA BANATEANA 17 Dec]	19
* Nuclear Plant Safety, Projected Output Discussed [TINERETUL LIBER 13, 15 Jan]	20

YUGOSLAVIA

Kosovo

Chairman of Kosovo Republic Assembly Interviewed [PULS 4 Feb]	23
---	----

Macedonia

Problems of Ethnic Serbs in Macedonia Analyzed [PULS 21 Jan]	27
* Food on Black Market in Macedonia [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 28 Jan]	28

Macedonian Daily Interviews Bulgarian President
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Macedonian 5 Feb 93 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed article including interview with Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria, by NOVA MAKEDONIJA; place and date not given: "Peace and Cooperation Will Prevail in the Balkans"]

[Text] *The name of a state cannot be imposed by dictate. It is the exclusive right of the people as citizens of Macedonia. If the war spreads to the south, through Kosovo and into Macedonia, the possibility exists that all Balkan states would become involved in it, directly or indirectly.*

Recently, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria, received at the presidential palace in Sofia Pande Kolemisevski, general director of the Nova Makedonija NIP [newspaper publishing company], Georgi Ajanovski, NOVA MAKEDONIJA editor in chief, and Branko Trickovski, NOVA MAKEDONIJA permanent correspondent in Bulgaria, and answered several questions related to relations and cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria, the issue of the international recognition of Macedonia, and the general situation in the Balkans.

Stressing that the Republic of Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the Republic of Macedonia, President Zhelev expressed his regret that this step was not followed by the international community, which yielded to Greek pressures and opposition. In his view, the name of a state cannot be imposed with dictate. It is the exclusive right of the people as citizens of Macedonia.

The Bulgarian president expressed the view that the danger of the spreading of the war from Bosnia-Herzegovina is a real threat and that what is most important now is the pressure applied by the international community to eliminate this hotbed of war. If the war were to spread to the south, through Kosovo and into Macedonia, the possibility exists for all Balkan countries, directly or indirectly, to become involved in it.

President Zhelev categorically denied rumors of some kind of secret talks or contacts with any Balkan country concerning a Bulgarian military involvement or the division of Macedonia. He felt that such agreements behind the back of a third country are immoral and inadmissible.

He spoke out in favor of a broader reciprocal and equal Bulgarian-Macedonian cooperation on the basis of reciprocal interests, considering that the development of present relations has not attained its possible intensiveness.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, the foundations of the new relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria were laid with the proclamation of Macedonian independence and the active recognition by Bulgaria, which was the first country to do so. How do you assess the development of reciprocal relations since then?

[Zhelev] As you said, Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the Republic of Macedonia as an autonomous and independent country, along with the other three former

Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. With this act of recognition of these republics we also proved that Bulgaria is pursuing an independent foreign policy. It did not ask for the views of the big powers, which proved that Bulgaria's new foreign policy does not apply double standards and criteria. We decided to recognize these republics and, as part of that recognition, the Republic of Macedonia. The further development of relations indicated, regretfully, that our example was not followed by the broader international community, as we expected. However, we are hoping that, sooner or later, there will be recognition, for it is simply inevitable. The name of its own state cannot be dictated to a nation. This would be a great national humiliation. We had a discussion with your President Kiro Gligorov in Burgas. Later, on the occasion of the staging of a play in Sofia, written by a Macedonian playwright, there was another discussion on encouraging a very active development of reciprocal relations, which is needed by both countries, on the basis of full equality and mutual respect. Unfortunately, such cooperation is not developing as intensively as we expected. We wanted to sign an agreement on tax facilities and protection of investments, and a commercial agreement. To the best of our knowledge, this has still not been achieved by either country although we are neighbors. No agreement has been concluded between the two countries of the kind concluded with a number of European and Balkan countries. I believe that a treaty between Bulgaria and Macedonia is necessary. It must be truly meaningful and not a formal agreement that would merely express the good wishes of the two countries. We are fully satisfied with the agreement reached with your President Kiro Gligorov on opening a Macedonian cultural center in Sofia and a Bulgarian cultural center in Skopje. We are prepared to engage in all types of cooperation not only between Bulgaria and Macedonia but also among all Balkan countries that should follow the same path. We wish to God that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in general, on Yugoslav territory, end soon. Gradually borders must become symbolic. There must be movement of ideas, technologies, services, and communications, for otherwise we shall not be able to leave the 20th century behind us and enter the 21st. We would like to find ways for a broad and free communication among people.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Do you think that the Bulgarian position, simplistically expressed with the formula of yes to a state and no to a nation, may cast a shadow on the exceptionally important step of the recognition, which is profoundly valued by the Republic of Macedonia? Actually, what new developments could be noted on the Bulgarian attitude toward the Macedonian nation?

[Zhelev] We believe that what is most important both for the Republic of Macedonia and the people is to gain state recognition. This is important not only to your people, to the Republic of Macedonia, but also to us, to the Turks, and the Greeks, i.e., to all Balkan peoples, and to Europe, for we consider the recognition of the statehood, autonomy, independence, and sovereignty of Macedonia an element of stability in the Balkans. The reason is that a state that has not been internationally and legally recognized is not protected by international law and, in the case of aggression,

God forbid, could not rely on the assistance of the United Nations or the CSCE. Let us not even mention the possibility of internal disorder, all of which could become a reason for intervention, thus worsening the situation in the Balkans.

We believe that we have a common language with you, a common history, culture, and religion, for which reason our historians and our historical science are not involved with the issue of recognition (I am speaking from the scientific viewpoint, from the scientific aspect of the matter) of the existence of a Macedonian nation. From the political viewpoint, this is a different matter. We believe that each nation and population of any state and every individual has the right to define himself according to what he feels is right. From that viewpoint we shall never allow ourselves to impose upon the people of the Republic of Macedonia how to call themselves or define themselves one way or another as a nation, in the same way that we would not allow anyone to tell our people how to define themselves. I believe that this is the most democratic way of resolving this issue. Considering that in both your country and ours there are people who believe that this is a betrayal, and that those people over there are Bulgarian, the way some people in your country believe that all of Pirin Macedonia is not Bulgaria, that it belongs to a different nation.... Let us not interpret matters this way. I believe that international law and international acts on the rights of man and conventions create the prerequisites for a more democratic resolution of such issues. That is how I formulate matters politically. We reject the example of our friends the Greeks with whom we disagree. We shall not allow ourselves the same behavior.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, you mentioned Pirin Macedonia. What is your view on the current issue of the rejection of self-determination asked of you by the Macedonians belonging to the Ilinden OMO [United Macedonian Organization]?

[Zhelev] The population of Pirin Macedonia has declared itself Bulgarian.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] In addition to the different interpretations, there was a long period of time in the course of which the Macedonians in Bulgaria were not allowed to organize themselves to express their will and, we believe, that to this day as well, in the latest census, they were not offered the possibility freely to express their national affiliation. This was interpreted as being an anti-Bulgarian act. You are always insisting that this is a matter of personal choice. Why then do you not let it be one?

[Zhelev] Such is not the case. Everyone was able freely to express his own will. You know that the people in that area are very sensitive. There were circles that sharply objected to the existence of the Ilinden organization. It is being said that it was financed by Belgrade or something of that kind, of which, actually, I am unaware. There were some problems related to the census. I am unfamiliar with the precise census data. I know that a certain number of people, perhaps some 10,000 or fewer people, defined themselves

differently, I truly do not know how many. In Pirin Macedonia, however, there is indeed a very negative attitude toward that organization.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Could you give us your view on the situation in the Balkans? Is it possible for the war to spread? How could this be prevented? And what is your attitude toward any eventual military intervention?

[Zhelev] We believe that the European community, the CSCE, and the United Nations must intervene much more seriously to stop such bloodshed. That war will never end unless Europe or the world organization undertake to stop it, to put an end to the situation and to sit down at the conference table and talk. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not simple: It is also ethnic, religious, between nations, and between religions. The issues are very complex and very difficult to resolve. If the world organization and the European Community do not take more energetic steps we may expect that the war could rapidly spread throughout the entire Balkans and lead to a Lebanization of the Balkans. The situation is assuming uncontrolled dimensions and internal disputes are triggered. If that war is not stopped it is possible that it may spread to include Kosovo and, considering the fact that there are Albanians in Macedonia, to spread to Macedonia as well. If a war breaks out in Kosovo, Macedonia as well would become somehow involved in such a war and the danger exists of the outbreak of a Balkan war.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] How would Bulgaria become involved?

[Zhelev] Consider the following scenario: In such a situation the economic conditions would become difficult, there would be hunger, poverty, and the population would begin to flee from the areas affected by the war. However, I do not believe that it will be escaping to Greece, and that part of that population would be running to Bulgaria. This means that we as well, although indirectly, would become involved in the war. In such a situation, some groups of the Pirin Macedonia population might arm themselves and take the defense of these refugees and help protect that population.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, would that apply to paramilitary formations?

[Zhelev] This would not apply to a Bulgarian Army but to some armed groups. In this manner Bulgaria would become indirectly involved in a war despite its wish. Otherwise, Bulgaria will never directly participate unless it is attacked.

This means that our policy is that no single Balkan country should participate with its armed forces or volunteers in the quarrels within the former Yugoslav republics. For otherwise this would mean a path directly leading to a new Balkan war.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] How do you interpret the statements by Bulgarian Prime Minister Berov on issuing guarantees that any eventual division of the Republic of Macedonia would be prevented? Why was such a declaration needed?

[Zhelev] I am placed in the unpleasant position of having to comment on statements by the prime minister. I do not know precisely what he said. To the best of my knowledge, a similar initiative was suggested by the Greek representative, while our prime minister, without properly realizing the significance of all of this, did not consider that this could be interpreted differently. The truth is that such a declaration is meaningless, since, with the recognition, we clearly declared that we are recognizing Macedonia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our position is known. On this we are categorical and there has been nothing new on this level. Even if such a declaration would be signed, it would make no sense. I assume that Professor Berov had all this in mind. Actually, if a state is recognized, one recognizes its borders and territorial integrity and the absence of any territorial claims toward it.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Would you like to comment on relations between Greece and Bulgaria and the frequent meetings between some military circles?

[Zhelev] I can tell you most responsibly, for I bear the responsibility for the overall national security of the state, that no such plans have ever existed nor do they exist now. I categorically deny such a thing. There have been no exchanges or agreements on this level. The very possibility of discussing such matters is inconceivable. From the moral viewpoint as well, it is inconceivable to hold discussion behind the back of another country.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, frequently in your addresses and statements to the public, similar to the statements made by our President Gligorov, you ask that we do not dwell a great on the past but look at the future, and to what the Balkans should become in the future. Similar statements have been made by Albanian President Berisha as well. Are you optimistic in this matter?

[Zhelev] We must be optimistic. There is no alternative to it. The alternative would be a Balkan war.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, how do you interpret the latest suggestions voiced in high international circles regarding the change of name of the Republic of Macedonia?

[Zhelev] Some compromise solutions have been suggested, mainly by France. The first step would be a change in the name as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Naturally, neither Mr. Gligorov, the president of the Republic, who is a very sensible person, nor the Macedonian parliament would decide to change the name. The public thinking in Macedonia is very aroused in this connection. In the course of my meeting with Mr. Gligorov I told him that one of our philosophers jokingly suggested that in order to be recognized, the Republic of Macedonia proclaim itself as the "Republic of Non-Macedonia."

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, could you tell us something about the internal situation in Bulgaria. What are the priorities in your country's further socioeconomic development?

[Zhelev] We have two main objectives in our development: to build democratic institutions and to convert the entire

economy to a market economy. In order to achieve this, we must take some other steps such as, for example, the creation of a civil society, the conversion to a multiparty system, a multiparty press, a free mass media, the creation of private media, in which area some accomplishments have already been scored. These are the legal guarantees for the existence of a law-governed state. These are the most important features in the conversion from a totalitarian to a democratic society. The main priority in our foreign policy is the integration with the European structures, which is very important to all postcommunist countries.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Does this imply the military participation of Bulgaria in NATO?

[Zhelev] Yes, it includes it. Last year, Bulgaria was accepted as the 27th regular member of the Council of Europe; last December, we initialed a treaty on becoming an associate member of the European Community. Several other formalities must be settled in connection with this fact. Furthermore, it is very important for us to be included in the European market, which we expect will be achieved in the course of this year.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] What is the correlation between the new democratic and the old forces, and is there any danger that the old forces will return?

[Zhelev] I believe that it would be absurd for such a thing to happen. The old regime was compromised as everyone was able to see. Furthermore, this was also seen by all communists with liberal leanings in the regime. The system lost the race in the most important area—the economy. It lost the race in the ideological and political areas. We became lost to the West and our citizens were deprived of opportunities. From that viewpoint as well, any return to communism is a 100-percent absurdity. Looking at them from the overall viewpoint, such issues may even appear ridiculous. Take the example of Russia: Yeltsin was a communist who restructured himself totally on an antitotalitarian basis. The example of Lithuania, however, indicated that even if they remain in power, the communists themselves overthrow that system and struggle for a conversion to democracy and a market economy. Nevertheless, the type of political forces which make this change is not without importance. To history this may not be of any great importance, but as a stage in the development of society this leaves traces. The democratic forces are able much more rapidly to realize and make changes the moment conditions to this effect are created. Naturally, any kind of anticommunism must not be interpreted as being the most democratic option. The example of Hitler and Stalin has indicated that they did not want democracy. Democracy implies liberalism, tolerance, human rights, and opportunities for the development of the individual. These are the foundations for the structuring of the new democratic processes.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] These ideas are found in your book *Fascism*, which was translated in the Republic of Macedonia and the promotion of which will be attended by you as well. What would you recommend finally, prior to your visit to the Republic of Macedonia, concerning our reciprocal relations?

[Zhelev] I wish that this year the Republic of Macedonia may be lucky, and gain international recognition, and take the normal democratic way to Europe toward which our post-totalitarian societies are aspiring. I believe that this would be the greatest and best thing which one could wish to the Republic of Macedonia.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Mr. President, before thanking you, we would like to ask you one more question. We would not wish you to consider this a provocation. How do you explain the disparity between the official policy of the Republic of Bulgaria toward Macedonia and the ever intensified propaganda conducted against the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian people that, in general, does not stop with scientific circles, some newspapers, and even some of your associates, to the effect that Macedonia is Bulgarian both as a land and a territory, and that its population is Bulgarian?

[Zhelev] I raised the same question with President Kiro Gligorov: Why is there anti-Bulgarian propaganda in the Republic of Macedonia, something which is so unprofitable. He gave me the same answer I am going to give you now. I believe that under the conditions of a free press and free expression of thought all views are possible. We have many newspapers. There are 25 dailies alone. We have other newspapers that are periodical, specialized, party-oriented, and neutral. They simply express the thinking of the public and there is no way to prohibit their publication and to limit the freedom of speech in the press. Let me give you an example of last summer. There was a demonstration in front of the Dimitrov Mausoleum and we saw some members of our own VMRO-SMD [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies] with flags and banners on which were inscribed their three demands and slogans of "long live the Bulgarian-Hungarian border." I asked them why the Bulgarian-Hungarian border, why limit themselves, why not set the border even beyond that. This reveals the absurdity of such thoughts. They looked at me uncomprehendingly. So, here we had 200 or 300 people with banners, marching and chanting, what were we to do? Were we to send the police after them to stop and disperse them? It made no sense. Such people do not enjoy any broad support among the public. Some people laughed at them, others supported them. Such is the nature of relationships. Now, if we wish to promote the freedom of thought and the press, we must accept such things. What is most important

to me is the position taken by the state. It is a commitment on the part of the state and the state institutions. The others can say anything they wish.

[Box, p 3]

Steering Democratic Changes in Bulgaria

Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev became the president of Bulgaria on 31 July 1990 after the elections for the Bulgarian National Assembly. On 13 January 1992 he won the presidential elections in Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian president is a doctor of philosophy. In 1964 he was expelled from Sofia University and from the Bulgarian Communist Party for having criticized Lenin. In the autumn of 1989, in the dramatic events as a result of which the Todor Zhivkov regime fell, Dr. Zhelev stood out as the most noted Bulgaria opposition leader. At the beginning of December of that year he became the leader of the Union of Democratic Forces, which was the most powerful opposition group in Bulgaria at that time.

The political philosophy of the 57-year-old Bulgarian president stems from his criticism of communist totalitarianism and the prospects of the Bulgarian state and society, which he views as residing in a parliamentary democracy and a market economy. His main efforts are concentrated on structural change as a vital prerequisite for Bulgarian democratization, in which the change of ownership is the most important aspect. He is in favor of a broader public consensus concerning the vital issues of change. This made him clash with the political leadership of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces].

Dr. Zhelev's foreign policy option has two key aspects: taking Bulgaria out of decades of isolation with a real, new content of internal relations and equal, open, and comprehensive cooperation with all countries, especially with the neighbors. Bulgaria's recognition of the Republic of Macedonia is, above all, a reflection of his principles of a new Balkan policy, in which looking at the future prevails over the frustrations inherited from the past.

The Bulgarian president is a respected statesman who is a key figure in internal relations in the Bulgarian transitional period. He skillfully guides Bulgaria, backed by the extensive approval of his views.

*** Former Intelligence Chief Petkov Interviewed**

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p 32

[Interview with Chavdar Petkov, former director of the National Security Services, by Zoya Dimitrova; place and date not given: "For the Past Three Years Our New Politicians Have Been Ruling in a Fog"]

[Text] *Very few of them know the type of information they could obtain from counterintelligence, claims Chavdar Petkov, former director of the National Security Service. An attempt on the life of the U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria was foiled.*

[Dimitrova] Have the Bulgarian Governments had a realistic attitude toward information they could obtain from counterintelligence? Are they aware of the information at your disposal?

[Petkov] In my view, they are not. People showed up in state positions who were unprepared and incompetent as administrators. A minister does not even think about and is not interested in the type of information such services have and how they could be useful to him.

[Dimitrova] What has defined priorities in counterintelligence in the past three years?

[Petkov] Since 1989 the services, despite the lack of a law to regulate them, are setting their own priorities in their activities. This is quite dangerous. It is accepted that we are doing it conscientiously, but we are guessing on the basis of our overall idea of the situation in the country and abroad. Nonetheless, the services should not set their own priorities. They are a function of state policy and should combine the interests not only of the special services but also of the main departments—defense, finance, and foreign affairs.

There has been mention of a "political police." The difference is quite relative between a political police and a special service. A special service always works at the cutting edge of the law. There must be something that keeps it on this edge. Poland and Hungary gave priority to passing laws on the special services. That is what has made them more relaxed and more efficient. The United States has never had a political police, but Hoover put one-half of the U.S. population in files based on various criteria, such as "leftist views," "terrorist," "participant in demonstrations." The fact that there is no Sixth [directorate] does not mean that such assignments cannot be carried out as well. That is why such a fine distinction should be defined by a superior authority jointly with the state and public oversight mechanisms.

A lack of understanding was shown concerning the nature of such services, along with mistrust. According to some, we are some kind of criminal group in this building, and perhaps we are stupid. Also that we keep informing the Supreme Party Council [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the old corps of generals. The politicians and deputies who, on their own initiative, showed a greater interest in us, think differently. It was only one of them, the chairman of a parliamentary commission—Asen Michkovski—who sent

me a letter to the effect that the commission would like to receive periodically from us information on certain issues within its competence. One of the ways of overseeing the activities of the special services is by using the information they provide.

[Dimitrova] What is the attitude of the representatives toward counterintelligence data?

[Petkov] In the spring of 1992 we were invited by the National Security Commission to discuss the condition of the special services. We submitted to them various types of information documents. There was a current analysis of the behavior of a variety of Islamic terrorist groups, based on the nature of the talks between Israel and Jordan. One gentleman, a member of the commission, I take my hat off to him by reason of his age, and he has my respect, read virtually all of the information and asked me whether this was a report written by Geshev [legendary figure in charge of internal security before 9 September 1944].

Another representative remained for three hours in my office and, eventually, it turned out that he was in the wrong office. We had a long and extensive discussion and, finally, the man told me that he had actually wanted to go elsewhere but found our discussion interesting.

[Dimitrova] After 1989 have the various governments sought information from the counterintelligence service on issues essential to Bulgaria? Have you provided such information?

[Petkov] The information we obtained was sent on a weekly basis to the minister of internal affairs. However, we did not receive any feedback from those who make decisions, the consumers of information—above all the government. The services work primarily for the government. We did not know on which issues to increase the volume of information and in which areas to intensify our activities, as well as what were the priorities of the government at a given moment. I believe that such a service should have its autonomous information access to consumers—the president, the prime minister, or individual ministers, for the head of the service bears the main responsibility for the quality of the information.

For example, when discussions between countries are to be held, the objective is for our country to benefit the most from such discussions. Such discussions should take place on the basis of equal standing. Brilliant diplomats could surmount an unequal situation, but this becomes uncertain if they are not given information support in advance.

[Dimitrova] Does this mean that our latest politicians are governing us in a fog?

[Petkov] To a large extent, yes. In Turkey, for example, by decision of the government, any department involved in any kind of foreign activity—trade, culture, finance, diplomacy—must have so-called "intelligence files" with data based on parameters issued in advance. The strength of any intelligence information is not to steal the map of a general's staff, which would be no big deal even if it were to occur, but to accumulate individual data from a number of sources and

to analyze such data. The result of the analysis is a superior product that facilitates the activities of the government.

[Dimitrova] Who were the politicians who were aware of the situation?

[Petkov] Dimitur Ludzhev, Asen Michkovski, and Dimitur Yonchev. Nikolay Slatinski also sought to make some sense of this entire situation, but it looks as though the composition of his commission is very cumbersome, and many of its members seem to be busy with their own internal affairs.

[Dimitrova] What is the criterion in assessing the quality of work in counterintelligence?

[Petkov] It includes the information acquired about the other side and its services, their interests for periods of one month, a quarter, or a year, the organization of their work, and the activities of the center in charge of organizing operative work on our territory.

[Dimitrova] What type of counterintelligence currently is needed by the government?

[Petkov] Regardless of where there is espionage, whether in Sofia, Vidin, or Mikhaylovgrad, it is equally threatening to the country as a whole. Let us say that a Stolipinovo case develops in Plovdiv. This does not mean that the same problem exists in all big cities. That is why such services are always centralized. The policy must be standardized. The local administrative authorities must not be able to influence them. Even in England no territorial structures exist. Their entire service is in London. However, there are special police departments that carry out such assignments. MI5 and MI6 operate independently of any kind of parochial or financial interests of individual groups, for they are answerable to the prime minister. Their autonomy is very strong.

I am thinking of what will develop 20 years from now. There are trends developing that will appear many years hence. Such trends are related to basic vital interests, such as territorial integrity, ethnic nature of the nation, vital interests. A unique opportunity is now appearing for other services to penetrate Bulgaria. They will know what is taking place in the state; they could manipulate decisions and blackmail politicians.

[Dimitrova] Has counterintelligence scored professional achievements during this period?

[Petkov] Either because of incompetence or lack of ethics, the press expressed gratitude to the Red Berets for saving the U.S. ambassador from an act of terrorism. I do not recall anyone in Bulgaria having shot at the U.S. ambassador, or the Red Berets protecting him with their bodies. No such thing occurred. When the situation developed, the U.S. ambassador was not in Bulgaria. He was taken out of the country because of that situation.

We received the initial signal that terrorist groups belonging to the Japanese and Filipino Red Armies were preparing an attempt against a target in the U.S. Embassy during the Persian Gulf crisis. The "target" was not indicated. It could have been the building of the embassy or the residence of the

ambassador. The first foreign group came to study procedures at our border points under more difficult circumstances: We had our strengthened observation of a category of foreign citizens—Arabs. Those who were to carry out the assignment had to know the precise steps involved in such observation. Then the group left.

The purpose of the second group was to study the target: place of residence and work schedule. I am referring to the U.S. ambassador.

We watched their activities. A third group was to set up a base within a family. The family could be recruited with a large sum of money and be told that its apartment was suitable as a company office. This met with no problem whatsoever. The Bulgarians, to begin with, would not understand what it was all about.

A fourth group was in charge of introducing the terror weapons. Finally, the kamikaze would arrive, who knew where to go, and who were aware of what had been prepared for committing the action—whether a pistol, an explosive, a missile, or a hand grenade. They would take it, pass by the embassy, do the act, and leave. The situation did not go that far. Their intention was blocked during the preparatory stage. The Red Berets act during the final stage, once the shooting has started. When matters reach the final stage one does not know who would prevail, the Red Berets, the ambassador, or the terrorist. The specific nature of the activities of the special services is that they describe what will take place, how it will take place, and monitor the process before it has developed. That is unlike the police, for the police comes after the commission of the crime.

[Dimitrova] How broad is the authority of the NSS [National Security Service] and how extensive is the authority of the TsSBOP [Central Service for the Struggle Against Organized Crime]? Could there be a war between the services in charge of performing tasks related to international terrorism or the drug traffic?

[Petkov] Each service has its own place on the issue of international terrorism. The TsSBOP has police functions. It must determine whether a given individual will be detained or extradited. The purpose of counterintelligence is to keep track of international terrorism from the viewpoint of whether it is backed by a certain country or the interests of a given government. It must determine whether this group or government has any interests and direct the activities of groups on our territory against purely Bulgarian or foreign interests.

We have obtained data on the appointment of a diplomat from an Arab country, whose identity was changed but who participated in the activities related to this act of terrorism. In order to get him out of this situation, have him get some rest, and hide from the special services, they "turned him." They brought him into Bulgaria with one type of identity, but he presented himself under a different identity to the official Bulgarian authorities. This is not the only case of introducing a member of a terrorist group into this country. Many of the Islamic terrorist groups serve a specific state policy. They do not function in the name of Allah or Islam.

[Dimitrova] How do our special services interact?

[Petkov] The people in intelligence are vulnerable from the counterintelligence viewpoint. They fear that they are watched and intercepted wherever they are. However, they are not always able to determine when they are indeed being watched. An intelligence agent must have some counterintelligence experience. In principle, intelligence avoids contacts with the special services. It must have an absolutely unimpeachable background and see to it that there is no doubt whatsoever of affiliation with Bulgarian Special Services, and establish contacts with people who have nothing in common with the local special services, such as diplomats, merchants, or ordinary citizens.

The opposite prevails in counterintelligence: It seeks direct clashes with the other service, to see it, to feel it, to know where it is, to find details about it. It works on its own

territory and has a great deal of opportunities. Many promising recruitments of agents take place at this point.

[Dimitrova] It is being claimed that in the United States all presidents have worked in the secret services.

[Petkov] It is in those services that the real truth can be seen. It is there that one learns how to think independently. One must put the puzzle together, sentence by sentence, or page by page, by each two pages or three pages. One does not develop a view on the basis of instructions and directives. One simply learns how to think realistically. This particularly applies to activities which have nothing to do with ideology but with technology. This is a high percentage of the activities in counterintelligence: We are not dealing with the enemies of communism or ideological sabotage. It is a craft. One learns how to think like a statesman and not like a party member. One learns how to find one's way in unfamiliar terrain, and this craft is viewed as a game, as a hunt.

*** Mass Dismissals on Ethnic Grounds Charged***93CH0385A Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian 27 Jan 93 pp 1-2*

[Text of interpellation addressed to the Slovak Republic's Government, on behalf of the Coexistence Political Movement and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, by Deputy Erno Rozsa: "Against an Improper Practice"]

[Text] On behalf of the Coexistence Political Movement and Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement caucuses, I am addressing this interpellation to the Slovak Republic's Government with the demand that, in the interest of the Slovak Republic, certain ministries cease and desist in their improper practice, the obvious purpose of which is to gradually exclude from state administration the representatives of the opposition parties and of the ethnic Hungarian community.

I am also addressing a similar interpellation to the Slovak Republic's prosecutor general, concerning the bias and excessive zeal demonstrated by Ersekujvar [Nove Zamky] District's prosecutor against the [Ersekujvar] municipal council.

Our caucuses regard as unwarranted, senseless, contrary to the republic's interests, as well as being in conflict with government policy, the fact that certain ministries, by perfunctorily implementing—and, we might say, abusing—the Labor Code, are dismissing ethnic Hungarians while pretending that the choice of the dismissed ethnic Hungarians is accidental. After all, "the law applies to everyone," does it not?

To mention for illustration merely a few of the names called to our attention, this happened recently to Messrs. Szomolai, Ponya, and Milkovic, the directors of the district road maintenance enterprises in Dunaszerdahely [Dunajska Streda], Galanta, and Rimaszombat [Rimavska Sobota], respectively; to Mr. Zoller, the head of the labor exchange in Leva [Levice]; to Mr. Szelle, the chief of police in Dunaszerdahely; to Mmes. Czizsmay and Keszeg in Komarom [Komarno]; and to Mr. Honbauer, chief of the district environmental protection office in Dunaszerdahely.

The Slovak Republic needs peace, stability, and every citizen's participation in creating prosperity. We fail to understand what purpose this unacceptable and hostile practice can serve when our country's constitutional representatives are advocating daily the basic principles of foresight, tolerance, and understanding for the vital interests of national minorities and ethnic groups, and are supporting them in their efforts to preserve their identities and maintain their comprehensive development.

We still remember vividly society's differentiation of individuals who were respectively "reliable" and "unreliable" from the viewpoint of the state and nation, and also the purging of the state apparatus after 1968. We refuse to believe that the behavior of the present government and its members will be shortsighted and emotive.

State administration's present composition and the structure of the organs of power already grant the executive organs a privileged position, and state administration regularly comes into conflict with the interests of local governments. Hence it is a fatal mistake when the ruling political party or movement wants to prevent the opposition and the minorities from participating in state administration.

Therefore the Coexistence Political Movement and Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement caucuses protest most firmly against such machinations. In full awareness of their responsibility, the caucuses warn the government that, so far as the nationalities are concerned, the government's program is not being implemented. And the caucuses call on the government to urge the institution of remedial measures through the ministers concerned, and to provide a written answer within the time limit specified by law, on what actions have been taken to curb the improper developments.

*** Budapest Deputies Discuss Komarno University***93CH0385B Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 23 Jan 93 pp 1-2*

[Unattributed interview with Imre Mecs and Erika Torzsok, SZDSZ deputies of the Hungarian National Assembly, and Gyorgy Gyimesi, chairman of the Coexistence Political Movement's district board, in Kralovsky Chlumec, date not given: "A Delegation of the Alliance of Free Democrats From Budapest Visits the Bodrog-Tisza Interfluvium"]

[Text] Deputy Imre Mecs, a member of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] Executive Committee, and Deputy Erika Torzsok, the head of the SZDSZ Secretariat for Minority Affairs, met yesterday with mayors from the northern part of the Bodrog-Tisza interfluvium, and from the Ung [Uzh] region.

We asked Imre Mecs how the meeting came about, and what was on its agenda?

[Mecs] We accepted with pleasure the invitation to meet with the mayors from the northern part of the Bodrog-Tisza interfluvium, and from the Ung region. Our talks today are a continuation of the establishment of contacts at the Miskolc conference organized by the social-liberal wing of the SZDSZ. A Coexistence delegation, led by Gyorgy Gyimesi, attended that conference. Now that Slovakia has become independent, we naturally would like to have much closer contacts than before, and to seek the ties that bind us. We are also confident that the tensions that developed between the Slovak and Hungarian peoples over time will eventually be dispelled. We are convinced that the two countries are interdependent economically, and in other respects as well. Here in Kiralyhelmece [Kralovsky Chlumec] we discussed concrete possibilities for regional cooperation.

[UJ SZO] Which possibilities in particular?

[Mecs] We support the local efforts to establish a free-trade zone, and there are discussions about Miskolc University locating an extension—a municipal university, in other words—here in Kiralyhelmece. Furthermore, Sarospatak Teachers College is likewise considering an extension here.

To ensure financing for the realization of these objectives, we have established the Zsuzsanna Lorantffy Foundation.

[Gyimesi] We are hard pressed for time. We need trained experts now to enable our region to stand on its own feet, economically and commercially. Following the example of Komarom [Komarno] Municipal University, therefore, we would like to begin the training of planning engineers here in Kiralyhelmece already in September of this year.

[UJ SZO] Isn't that time limit too short?

[Gyimesi] The leadership of Miskolc University has reacted positively to our needs. It has already drafted a plan and has even prepared a budget. Instruction can start in September, if we are able to provide the 5.0 million forints required for our start, besides covering the overhead costs.

[Torzsok] It is true that we are living in what is an under-capitalized part of Europe. But it must also be emphasized that the borders of three or four countries meet here. That fact harbors economic possibilities capable of leading us to those forms of cooperation that could raise all of us out of our present disadvantageous situation.

* UDMR Congress Speech: No Foreign Funds Received

93CH0355B Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
23 Jan 93 p 22

["Excerpts" from speech by Gyula Vida, president of the National Control Committee of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, at the Union's 16-18 January 1993 congress in Brasso: "The UDMR Has Received No Monetary Contributions From Abroad"]

[Text] *At the request of the delegates to the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] congress, the National Control Committee [NCC] of the UDMR presented a report of its findings pertaining to the documentation of foreign contributions and the organization's property management practices in order to dispel even the suggestion that individuals have been using funds received by the Union from abroad for private purposes. This is one of the reasons why UDMR President Gyula Vida's speech is significant, as can be seen in the excerpts below.*

(...) We regret to have to report to you, esteemed congressional delegates, that the shortcomings identified earlier still have not been rectified. As an example we would point out that the Union's budget for 1992 still has not been finalized and approved. Hence the accounting of our 1992 expenditures was not done on the basis of budgetary guidelines. The problems connected with the monitoring of payments made by member organizations and the management of assets located at the Union's headquarters in Bucharest have not been resolved. The records of fixed assets and inventory items have not been transferred to the appointed administrators, and documents pertaining to expenditures have not been consistently entered into the records of the national secretariat....

The NCC has examined certain aspects of the activities of Tulipan, Ltd., since that company has been operating with financial support from the Union. Our findings are as follows: The national presidium has failed to provide oversight over the activities of the company's board of directors, which has been practically unable to function; there are no controls in place to ensure effective property management and administrative practices at the board and regional office levels, and the provisions of the bylaws have not been observed. Without a staff of auditors there is no one to oversee the company's property management practices, which is in violation of the law. The possibility, therefore, exists that some of the branch offices have not been managing the company's assets properly.

On 10 March 1992, the presidium of the UDMR's Udvarhelyszek steering committee submitted a petition to the national presidium of the UDMR requesting the establishment of a special commission to oversee the activities of the UDMR's Udvarhelyszek city steering committee and presidium, including their property management practices.... The committee conducted an audit in the first half of March 1992.... In its report it concluded that there were personal animosities and mutual accusations between the Udvarhelyszek presidium and the city leadership both in the areas of organization and property management, which called for

immediate organizational measures, including the appointment of new officers. (...) On 20 October 1992, the Udvarhelyszek presidium submitted another report, charging four members of the city leadership with fraudulent misuse of funds amounting to several million lei. Upon receipt of the report, committee president Gyula Vida asked administrative president Adam Katona to forward the case file, complete with all relevant documentation, immediately to Bucharest for an investigation. First they requested a delay to allow the local control committee to complete its own investigation. Despite several notices since then, so far they have failed to turn the documents related to the case over to the NCC for evaluation. (...)

In 1991 and 1992, the NCC received several public complaints requesting it to look into how contributions paid to the Union in foreign currency are accounted for. Some of the complaints even listed the sources of contributions. After we had conducted a financial audit at the national secretariat and the Bucharest headquarters, we also looked into this issue but found no foreign currency entries in the books under "contributions." Since there have been charges in the press concerning foreign currency contributions, we requested in writing that the national presidium state its position clearly, for on the basis of the existing bookkeeping records we had found no trace of such contributions. On 13 January 1992, the presidium responded by stating that "the UDMR has received no monetary contributions from abroad." (...)

Since on 30 November 1992 we received another complaint, we conducted a second audit of the books of the national secretariat, covering the period from April through December, and found no record of such payments. Consequently we have concluded that although the moral burden is on those who may have received such payments and failed to account for them, this was a very sensitive issue in which the contributors themselves would have to make the final determination. Hence the congress invites anyone who may have contributed to use its forum to request that their contributions be accounted for.

Implications of Recent UDMR Congress Analyzed

93BA0571B Bucharest BARICADA in Romanian
26 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Stefan Stoian: "The UDMR Lesson"]

[Text] On Sunday, 17 January 1993, the proceedings of the Third Congress of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] were concluded in Brasov. Despite alarmist rumors spread in the nationalist-communist press and despite the total indifference expressed in the ruling circles, especially in Cotroceni [presidential offices], the congress scored a net victory for the spirit of tolerance. Thus, Hungarian moderates proved their Europeanism and political maturity, so necessary today in a world ravaged by irreconcilable and bloody inter-ethnic conflicts.

Today, Romania finds itself in the middle of three conflicts based on inter-ethnic reasons: the war in the former Yugoslavia, where the fighting has begun to involve former allies—the Croats, Muslims, and Bosnians; the especially

tense situation created by ethnic Russians in the Moldovan Republic; and, to a lesser degree, at least for the moment, the velvet divorce of the Czech and Slovak republics. Against this European background animated by nationalistic claims, ready at any moment to throw the entire region into a conflict with unforeseeable consequences, it is becoming increasingly clear that the only solution for Romania continues to be its internal stability. Unfortunately, however, our extremely fragile domestic stability is being placed in serious danger in a totally irresponsible manner. On one hand, the extremist political parties and, on the other, the government are agitating with nationalist-communist slogans whose aims, clearly, lead nowhere but to the advancement of sizable distractions.

A short excursion through history shows us that during all crisis periods extremist parties appear on a regular basis. For example, Nazism appeared in a Germany shattered by a devastating crisis (after WWI), and the French Right raised its head, by way of the "Action Francaise," when the country was under occupation. Things were no different in Romania. Hidden behind the skirt of the *Securitate*—which, for its part, had been carefully hidden from the justified rage in the streets—the extremists appeared and, at the same time, so did their periodicals, after the elections of 20 May 1990, at the beginning of the communist restoration. People compromised under the former regime, collaborators, and parasites of all kinds, instead of following the advice in the "Appeal to Parasites," preferred to be reborn politically. The same was true of the wolves wearing sheep's clothing, that is, the clothing of a nationalism that had been previously discredited because of its retrograde and excessive nature, and that, today, is discredited in an equally grotesque manner.

Now, after three years, while the government has not been able to give a constructive response to the serious problems that were and still are confronting the country, it too has resorted to a nationalist diversion. The government-extremist alliance is not an accident, and drives the Romanian Parliament. Similar diversionist techniques are used, since behind these two hubs there is but a single center: the same tentacled, mafia-type organization whose impact today is directed on a priority basis towards the economic sphere. This is being done, however, without neglecting the political phenomenon which we used to call and will continue to call the *Securitate* (within which the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] is a simple cog in a much larger wheel that has penetrated all the strata of Romanian society in a malignant manner).

The Third UDMR Congress was offering this political mafia the ideal occasion to incite inter-ethnic conflicts so as to draw attention away from the economic catastrophe that had been irresponsibly brought on precisely by this mafia, and, at the same time, to compromise the Democratic Convention. Any excesses stemming from the Congress of the Hungarians could have resulted in a break in the unity of the opposition, which would have meant its elimination. We should not ignore the fact that, in an involuntary manner, this objective could have been attained through a victory of the radical wing of the UDMR. Actually, this Congress had

to resolve two problems: the election of a president and the renunciation or suspension of the principle of "local autonomy." For the post of president, the problem was proving to be especially difficult since one of the people under discussion was an extremely powerful person, the pastor Laszlo Tokes. His renunciation of his candidacy for the presidency of the UDMR constituted proof of a realistic political sense, one devoid of careerism; his argument was that he understands the need to withdraw since the majority of Romanians have a distorted picture regarding his goals. As for the concept of local autonomy, announced in a bellicose statement in Cluj, things were not quite so simple; it is a known fact being that the extremist wing of the UDMR was stubbornly supporting it.

Despite all this, the documents of the Congress show a victory at all levels for the spirit of moderation, as evidence by the political orientation of the new president, Bela Marko, and in the renunciation of the incriminating policy contained in the Cluj declaration, which had unacceptable connotations for Romanians. This is a lesson in wisdom that should be food for thought.

* Liberal Rusu's Speech to UDMR Congress

93CH0355A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 20 Jan 93 pp 1, 4

[Speech delivered by Horia Rusu, president of the Youth Wing of the Liberal Party, to the 16-18 January 1993 congress of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania: "The Speech for Which C.V. Tudor Would Put Someone Before a Firing Squad"]

[Text] The fundamental premise of classical liberalism is that only individuals have rights. If it so happens that the individuals also share a common language and culture, it may be their desire to belong to the same political community. This is nothing more than an extension of the individual's right to freedom of association. Within these national and political entities the function of government is restricted to the protection of freedoms and private property.

Had there been ethnic minorities in the democratically created nation states, one could have always found instances of cultural and linguistic deprivation; however, when it comes to civil freedoms and economic life these minorities could have rested assured that the state would have been forbidden to use its power to favor one group over another.

Unable to remain intact as a principle symbolizing the rights of the individual and determining his political fate within a certain geographic zone, self-determination in the 19th and 20th centuries has evolved into a collective concept. National self-determination has come to mean the political unification of people sharing a common language, regardless of whether or not they all want to belong to the same state. Today it is equated with a call for the political assimilation of all territories where ethnic or national groups once lived, irrespective of how long they may have been there or of the wishes of those who currently populate those areas.

It has come to mean that the state has a responsibility to mandate the adoption of a given language, cultural customs,

and traditions by way of public education, propaganda, resistance to the influence of foreign cultures, irrespective of the wishes of the citizens of the nation state, including the country's linguistic and cultural minorities. What we see around us today are the consequences of the collective notion of "national" and "independent" self-determination. Both the Croats and the Serbs are talking about their own so-called "historical" borders, and neither side is willing to allow the people living there to decide where those borders should be by way of free elections. The Estonians have been complaining about the "Russification" attempts of the Soviet regime, while at the same time wanting themselves to "Estonify" their Russian minority, with the eventual aim of compelling them to leave the country.

The Western Europeans are no better. The French farmers are protesting what they call the flooding of their markets by "Eastern European agricultural products."

The Germans are working to change their very liberal laws on refugees claiming that the Poles and the Russians are coming to "take away jobs" which by right belong to the Germans.

To which state will the individual belong? How will he be able to use his property, and with whom will he be able to engage in trade?

Who will be given permission to live in a given geographic zone? What language will they be required to speak; and in what language will they carry out their business transactions? What will their children learn in school? Whose cultural heritage will receive subsidies and support?

The individual has no say about any of these kinds of questions. They are decided for them by the wielders of political power, who determine one's nationality, and use their power to force upon others their vision of the national interest and independence.

They have taken the classical liberal notion of national self-determination, the role of which was to serve the highest political aspirations associated with individual freedoms, and diverted it onto a collective course as they have done with so many other ideals of our times.

Every one of the nationalist tensions and conflicts that we are witnessing today is attributable to this diversion.

There is no other cure to the problem plaguing Europe today than to return to the principles of classical liberalism in which the emphasis is on the individual's right to self-determination and free association.

This, however, would require a change of mentality for which, it appears, Europe is not yet ready.

This deviation toward a "collective concept," unfortunately, is deeply rooted.

Having shared with you my general concerns I would like to address some of the specific ones that shape our own reality, but first I want to say a few things about the "limits of democracy."

Democracy is definitely superior to tyranny. It offers the possibility of choice and change (when government becomes too strong it does so with reluctance, as evidenced by the situation in Romania today). But democracy is not to be equated with freedom. Democracy simply means that public officials are chosen by way of elections. But being elected by the people does not guarantee that the elected persons (not to mention the nonelected bureaucracy) will serve to protect freedom.

Democracy, if not coupled with individual rights, will become majority rule. So what must we do? And what can we do together? Let us start out by clarifying some concepts. Since for a long time we have been contaminated by the ideas of "collectivism" and "nationalism," our vocabulary has also been reduced to slogans. Anyone speaking about "federalization" today is immediately accused of wanting to divide up the country and sell it out to Hungary; when I talk about individual rights, some react with fear that as members of one or another ethnic group they would not be able to retain their cultural identity. These are just two examples of the prevailing "confusion of ideas." On one thing, however, we must all agree, and that is that the problems facing us cannot be analyzed and resolved in global terms that would be applicable to all areas of our country.

Timisoara [Timisoara] is a good example of peaceful coexistence among citizens of various ethnic groups, and as a resident of that city I can say this with pride. In Kolozsvar [Cluj] the problem has different dimensions as it does in Galac [Galati], where the only place Romanians ever get to see a Hungarian is on TV. But there is a solution which we must all accept; the liberal principle of "local autonomy." If we proceed from this ideal we can solve everything.

Is there such a thing as a national problem in Romania? We can unequivocally agree that there is. Namely the problem of transition to capitalism, i.e., the problem of shock therapy, which is the only solution that will prevent Romania becoming reduced to nothing more than a source of labor and a market for foreign goods.

Those political forces that work against this philosophy are in fact pursuing policies that are contrary to the fundamental interests of our nation. From this point of view, Hungarian Romanians have already exercised their option by proving in two elections that they are "more Romanian" than many Romanians. I think I should make clear to you the position of the Youth Wing of the National Liberal Party with respect to the two extremist parties, Great Romania and the Party of Romanian National Unity: We feel that we, Romanians, have the responsibility of standing up to them; they are a "disgrace" to us, Romanians, hence we are the ones who must take care of the problem. Do not waste your energies on this, for I repeat that it is something that we must do. You work on resolving the problems within your own community, if indeed you have problems to resolve. I would not want to conclude without conveying our party's greetings to the Liberal Circle of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], the group which stands closest to the political philosophy of our party.

Legal Action Against Former Dissident Discussed

93BA0596A Bucharest *BARICADA* in Romanian
2 Feb 93 p 14

[Interview with Doina Cornea by Liviu Valenas; place and date not given: "My Trial Will Be a Lesson for the Entire Opposition"]

[Text] [Valenas] Esteemed Mrs. Doina Cornea, it seems that you are now inaugurating a new chapter in the history of "the original democracy" and "the enlightened despot"—political trials against the opposition.

[Cornea] I do not know why this honor has been bestowed upon me. It simply makes me want to laugh! The current government feels that it has now quickly resolved all questions about the Revolution and the things that happened over the past three years. Doina Cornea is the one to blame for the terrorists of December 1989, the four miners' riots, unemployment, inflation, and misery, and the failure of the country to receive Most Favored Nation status. In other words, Ion Iliescu believes that I am to blame for everything.

[Valenas] But, specifically, what happened?

[Cornea] As everyone in the country and abroad knows, on 8 February 1993 I was summoned by a certain prosecutor named Miculescu to appear before the State Prosecutor in Bucharest (another illegal act, since I am a resident of Cluj). The written summons says that I am being called in as a person who is to be charged under Article 26, which falls under Article 162 of the Criminal Code.

[Valenas] The Criminal Code drawn up by Ceausescu's jurists?

[Cornea] Yes! Forget for a moment that all these same jurists are now still in the court system, even in leadership positions, so it is clear why we do not have a new Criminal Code. Article 162 refers to "seriously undermining state order." This violation calls for capital punishment or a minimum of 15 to 20 years in prison, loss of civil rights, and total confiscation of property.

[Valenas] The last point does not effect you much because you do not have any property, but how is it we still have capital punishment, since immediately after the Revolution Iliescu abolished the death penalty?

[Cornea] Yes, that is true, but it can be brought back especially for Doina Cornea. Boy, does this strange situation make me want to laugh! It seems to me that Mr. Iliescu has completely lost his sense of humor.

[Valenas] That view has recently been supported by the poet Mircea Dinescu in an interview granted to us, saying: "If Ion Iliescu had a sense of humor, he would not have won the elections." But, let us return to more serious things. What do you think is the reason behind your being summoned to the State Prosecutor's office?

[Cornea] Officially, I do not know anything. The summons merely states that charges have been brought against me on the basis of Article 26, which falls under Article 162 of the Criminal Code. But, from my contacts in the Romanian

legal system, I understand that these charges were brought against me because, through Romanian Television, I instigated miners to organize a general strike as a sign of solidarity with their colleagues who were beaten up and shot during those days by the Army and the forces that belong to Ion Iliescu in Cotroceni. I was aware then that the miners caused serious damage, for which I must be held responsible. But, they were not the ones who killed Andrei Frumusanu and Aurica Crainiceanu. Those two were killed by someone in the paramilitary (or military) forces, who belong to Ion Iliescu. But, let us return to the question, even if the miners were guilty of disorder and destruction, no one has the right to shoot them with buckshot, with salt, and so forth.

[Valenas] But, going back to the call for a general miners' strike, there are two things that are very clear. On one hand, it did not take place, and, on the other, since when is a strike—even if it is a general strike—"a serious undermining of state order"? It would seem that strikes are something normal in a nation of laws.

[Cornea] In a nation of laws, yes! But, let us return to the supposed reasons that form the basis of my invitation to the State Prosecutor's office. I have heard of another reason: that President Iliescu is trying to use my trial and eventual conviction to teach the entire opposition a lesson!

[Valenas] To me, it would seem natural for him to proceed in such a manner. Basically, step-by-step, he is setting free those guilty of the crimes of December 1989. It has been announced that, after the scheduled freeing of Nicu Ceausescu and Filip Teodorescu (not to mention the others) on 29 March of this year, there will be a reconsideration of the convictions of Dinca, Bobu, Postelnicu, and Manescu. In the future, it is clear that other close Ceausescu collaborators will be released. If a series of vacancies are created in the penitentiaries, would it not seem natural to you for these places to be filled by those who lost the 27 September elections? Basically, is this not normal in a nation of laws?

[Cornea] It is clear that Mr. Iliescu wants to teach both the Democratic Convention and public opinion a lesson. I think that Prosecutor Miculescu was right to issue the summons and that the legal proceedings that were started are also justified; only the addressee is wrong. It is not I who should be summoned to the State Prosecutor's office, but rather Mr. Iliescu, Mr. Magureanu, and the others. They are the ones who are responsible for the deaths of the young people in December 1989, for the four miners' demonstrations, and for compromising Romania's image around the world. But, probably out of fear, they are trying to shift responsibility onto others, that is, on the victims.

[Valenas] Will you show up at the State Prosecutor's office on 8 February?

[Cornea] No! For two reasons. The main reason is that my husband, a former fighter for the liberation of Transylvania—who fought with the Romanian Army all the way to the Tatra Mountains—is very ill and I must take care of him. The second reason is that I will respond to a clumsy and pitiful masquerade such as this with my absence.

[Valenas] Domestic public opinion and, especially, international opinion no longer understands any of this. The government in Bucharest complains that it wants to be part of Europe, part of the Council of Europe, but it does everything to bring it about that its request for admission will be again rejected. I am referring to the fact that the parliamentary delegation includes an individual of the ilk of Adrian Paunescu—I will no longer refer to him as the "Hungarian" representative of ROMANIA MARE—and, on the other hand, they bring you to trial right now... By the way, they have already waited a year and a half; so why not wait just two or three more weeks, so that first we could be accepted into the Council of Europe, and then settle accounts with you?

[Cornea] Do you think that Ion Iliescu and those around him really need the Council of Europe? Do you think that Ion Iliescu needs the Most-Favored-Nation clause? No, they categorically do not need them. They are linked forever to Russia, to Moscow! It is true that the Soviet Union so dear to them, and first of all to Ion Iliescu, has disappeared, but, nonetheless, there is still the Russian Federation, Moscow is still there, Yeltsin is still there. Something is better than nothing! Don't you see that the government is agitating with regards to Transylvania, which belongs to us and which no one can take from us, but what specifically is President Iliescu doing for the unification of Romania and Bessarabia? What is he doing specifically to help our Bessarabian brothers? Let me return, however, to your question concerning our admission to the Council of Europe. It is clear, therefore, that the Cotroceni government does not want this, but rather wants to lie once again to the Romanian people, telling them, "Look, we have done everything in our power, but once again the opposition has opposed Romania's admission." Not gratuitously, about a month ago President Iliescu launched this big lie in connection with Mr. Coposu's presumed request that Romania not be accorded Most-Favored-Nation status. I repeat, a big lie! Now, we have an equally big lie: "Doina Cornea is to blame for our not being admitted to the Council of Europe."

[Valenas] But, you know, somewhere Ion Iliescu is right. Western governments, I assure you, are VERY WELL INFORMED about the state of affairs in Romania, and they will say the following: "After all, what has really changed in Romania given that now Mrs. Doina Cornea—who was relentlessly pursued by Ceausescu on the basis of the same Article 162 of the Criminal Code—is being tried by Ion Iliescu, this time on the basis of the same 'famous' Article 162 of the Criminal Code?" And, they will ask something else: "What credibility will Romania have when it appears in Strasbourg represented by the most compromised person in the country, Adrian Paunescu, the most wretched person in the entourage of former dictator Ceausescu?" I hope with all my heart that I will be contradicted by events, but I strongly doubt that under these conditions we will be accepted into the Council of Europe.

[Cornea] You are correct in everything you have said. But, I want to make one thing perfectly clear: I, Doina Cornea, want Romania to be admitted with full rights to the Council of Europe, now! This acceptance will be recognition of the

Romanian people as a worthy and civilized people! It will not be the admission of Ion Iliescu's clique into the Council of Europe. It is not they who will be admitted there, but Romania! As such, I intend to undertake absolutely nothing, absolutely NOTHING, which could impede our entry into this Council of Europe. I am absolutely serious about this. In fact, I fully endorse the decision of the Democratic Convention of Romania—of which I am a part—to support the proposition that Romania's be admitted this year with full rights to the Council of Europe. As such, I will not request international protection, and I do not want great publicity with regards to my case, precisely because I do not want to compromise Romania's admission to the Council of Europe.

[Valenas] And, what is the position of the mayor of Cluj, Mr. Gheorghe Funar, with regards to your case? Is he mixed up in this meeting with the state prosecutor? Has he caused you any problems as mayor of the city in which you live?

[Cornea] I do not believe that Mr. Funar is in any way directly involved as far as my session with the state prosecutor is concerned. He is actually nothing more than a totally subservient tool of President Iliescu. Actually, who is Funar? He is an absolutely worthless personality, created primarily by scandal and, to a large degree, by the press. He is a "good Romanian...."

[Valenas] Mrs. Doina Cornea, in conclusion, I wish you good health and best wishes, and I hope that the masquerade of Article 162 of the Criminal Code will be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only because it is damaging Romania's reputation.

[Cornea] I thank you for your good wishes, but I have the impression that the "new" Doina Cornea case is Ion Iliescu's grand diversion. Behind the scenes of this case a strong effort is being prepared against the opposition and, especially, against the free press. This is my impression, but I hope I am wrong!

Charges Against Archbishop Vornicescu, Removal Urged

93BA0570A Bucharest BARICADA in Romanian
26 Jan 93 p 8

[Article by Emilian Mirea: "An Archbishop For Our Peace of Mind"]

"The Piety" of His Holiness Nestor Vornicescu or the Abuses of a Communist Prelate

[Text] His Holiness Nestor Vornicescu, the archbishop of Oltenia since the time of communist rule (a position he still holds today), along with Patriarch Teoctist, is one of the most controversial prelates in the Romanian religious hierarchy. That he retains his position is due to a certain inexplicable "inertia" at this time and, of course, his acceptance in Bucharest. Yet he is guilty of numerous abuses that he is still committing today just as he did prior to December 1989.

Recently, his dictatorial bent was evident in the "Iulian Mladin case," a priest at the Saint Spiridon parish in

Craiova who, because he is guilty of not blindly following orders from above (although those higher up frequently violate the Penal Code), and because he speaks of the unholiness of Nestor Vornicescu, was suspended abruptly from his church duties. The church hierarchy attempted to remove him by force from the parish where he has served for over six years. The attempt was foiled by the parishioners who formed a human barricade around the church. Zealously, Nestor Vornicescu sent summons after summons to Father Iulian Mladin and the parish council and the parishioners fired them back as though it were a game of tennis. Why? Because Father Iulian Mladin is not guilty of any wrongdoing; it is a typical case of abuse of power and His Holiness Nestor Vornicescu's dictatorial ways, a prelate who has confused the Oltenian parish with his own estate.

His Holiness Nestor Capriciously Harms his Subordinates

"I am Father Iulian Mladin from the Saint Spiridon parish in Craiova where I have served since 1986. I believe that the problems I have encountered, and that I am still encountering, are due to my nonconformist tendencies and the fact that I believe in truth and justice. Reality shows us that there are men—even sons of the church—who have abandoned their moral values. I recall that I have run into such situations ever since becoming a priest. For example, the former archbishop of Oltenia, the current Patriarch of Romania, Teoctist, went so far as to accuse my wife of activities against the Communist Party and demanded that she empty the contents of her purse every time she visited me at the bishopric. I said to the then Bishop-Vicar Nestor Vornicescu that the bishop should stop his psychological terrorism; an observation which the current archbishop did not like at all.

"The problems began after I was assigned to Craiova. I had to deal with persecution and all sorts of chicanery. Then came December 1989, and on 21 December, all priests were summoned by telephone to participate in a working session at the bishopric on 22 December. Nestor Vornicescu began the session with a blistering, communist-style attack on 'hooligans and ne'er-do-wells' at Timisoara. He had arrived at this view from reading an article in the former official Dolj judet party paper, INAINTE. Then he stated, 'We are honor-bound to defend our elected president.' It was recommended to us that we not stop by city hall or at the judet committee building and thus avoid agitating any groups of citizens; that we were not to ring the alarm bells to stir up people and that we should advise our parishioners to stay at home and celebrate the winter holiday and New Year's Eve with their families, and avoid bringing groups of families together.

"On the way home, I stopped by the current prefect's office where there were groups of people; however they were not hooligans or ne'er-do-wells, but people simply fed up with communism. The same day, Professor Father Petre Semen from Harsu Parish telephoned the archbishop to ask what should be done now given the new situation (after the dictator had fled). The response that he received was an outpouring of profanity and vulgarities, most unbecoming for an archbishop.

"Following 22 December, for 40 days the Archbishop of Oltenia, Nestor Vornicescu, was in hiding at the Tismana monastery, along with a number of generals and Bishop Gherasim of Vilcea (who was ready to flee, with all his bags packed). The monastery was guarded by soldiers. After a while, probably having received a telephone call telling him that the situation was in good hands and that he could return to Craiova, Nestor Vornicescu calmed down and returned to resume his functions. When he returned, Oltenian priests expected that the archbishop would come to them and begin to discuss the desirability of his remaining in his position. Learning from his spies that the priests were going to demand his resignation and a public 'mea culpa,' Nestor Vornicescu did not call the meeting nor did he participate in any plenary session of Oltenian priests; instead he began a campaign of intimidating the priests who had called for his resignation at the first conference held at the bishopric after the revolution. Because of this, after the conference at the bishopric, I denounced the intimidation campaign directed against me and I called the former 'right hand man' of Nestor Vornicescu—Father Ilie Budin—a 'wretched and rapacious wolf' as it says in the Bible. This was not slander, as is amply sustained by the facts. For those remarks, I was later made the subject of a trumped-up hearing, a religious trial, where I was charged with calumny. I was forced to appear numerous times on this issue, but in the end it all came to naught; the whole process was one of intimidation.

"Last year, just before the holidays, I received an order from the bishopric informing me that an investigative commission would come to St. Spiridon parish. Professor and Diocese Delegate Marian Nita, judge Dumitru Luca, Archpriest Stefan Cotea and the accountant Petre Popa were to make up the commission. They were to review the parish's economic and administrative records. They found everything to be in order. After the inspection, I told them (the ones sent to do the inspection) that I felt this, too, was an act of intimidation. I said that we no longer have to worship when the bells ring in Moscow, but when our own bells ring; that we do not have to worship their favorites but our own. I said that we no sooner got rid of the devil, than we had to deal with his father, the Archbishop of Oltenia. The commission members told me that I was correct but, unfortunately, I am the only one carrying on this struggle and that the higher-ups only do what their interests dictate. After the inspection, the commission stated that everything was in order, that the church was clean as a whistle, and that the parish house had been renovated and was in good condition.

An Oltenian "Laszlo Tokes?"

"In 1992, Nestor, archbishop of Oltenia, wanted to run for Parliament on the FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front] list of candidates. At the time, I told my colleagues and my parishioners that it was not good for the church to be divided according to the political leanings of the archbishops. I said that the church should be a binding force for all its worshippers. I made these same remarks at a meeting where FSN [National Salvation Front] senator Ion Predescu, and former chairman of the Craiova judet court Constantin Furtuna, were in attendance. At the meeting, the

issue of Nestor Vornicescu's resignation or removal from his archbishop's position was discussed. Doubtless, the archbishop was informed of my attitude. The results: A few months later I received an order from the archbishop suspending me and replacing me with an older priest, Mihalache Tudorica, a collaborator with the current Dolj judet semi-official newspaper, CUVINTUL LIBERTATII. Tudorica had participated in the FDSN campaign along with Nestor Vornicescu. Fr. Tudorica Mihailache with the archbishop's orders in hand, tried to occupy St. Spiridon parish by force. However, the faithful or the parish council blocked this move by formed a human wall around the church. A second order suspending me was issued and said regardless of my situation, Fr. Tudorica Mihailache had to be installed in my place. Then, Fr. Ioan Ioanescu, along with archpriest Mihai David and accountant Popa Petre, came to me and informed me that as a result of Report 509/1992, as allowed in Preogative No. 50, Letter A, I had to surrender my parish for abuses which I had committed. They did not, however, specify what these 'abuses' were. In reply, I and the parish council asked if the Financial Guard had investigated the abuses and thefts of Archbishop Nestor. The answer was given by their departure without making any reply.

The Bishopric Obtains Elena Ceausescu's Automobile for His Holiness

"There has been much said about Metropolitan Nestor Vornicescu's 'piety' prior to December 1989. Among the issues that raise doubts on the part of the rank and file priests is the fact that after the revolution, the bishopric acquired Elena Ceausescu's automobile for His Holiness and the car of former prime minister Constantin Dascalescu for Bishop-Vicar Damaschin Severineanul (true name, Dumitru Paguba). When the priests asked why there was such a wasteful expenditure of funds at a time when Dacia 1300's were available, the archbishop replied that 'it was a good opportunity.' Then, the bishopric's automobile, a Dacia 1310, was sold to Nestor's chauffeur for 'a small consideration.'

"Regarding his entourage, the situation is more than doubtful. Church canon demands that the archbishop, a candidate for monastic life, be a model of chastity and modesty. But what has happened? On the archbishop's orders, priests divorced from their wives, and monks who live together with nuns and have their own apartments have come to the city. This is a situation contrary to the demands of monastic life. Then there are the monumental improprieties in the administration of the bishopric's holdings, and of the wine and brandy manufactured on the premises. For example, this year alone, seven or eight truckloads of grapes were obtained and five or six truckloads of wine were produced; not one drop of this wine went to the parishes and no one knew where it disappeared until it was discovered that last year, the recipient of the church wine was Senator Gelu Voican Voiculescu. It is the same situation with the brandy that is produced.

"Shady business practices were involved in the sale of religious calendars. In 1991, 41,000 calendars were printed for the bishopric and then sold, but no one knows what happened to the money that resulted from the sales. There

was no accounting and no one knows into whose pockets the money disappeared. It is rumored among the priests that the money went toward financing the FDSN electoral campaign. The same situation was repeated in 1992; there were no records kept of the number of calendars printed and sold, nor the destination of the funds generated. Some priests, for example Fr. Zamfir, have their own printing facilities, and have printed and sold a massive number of calendars that do not belong to the bishopric. The money, naturally, went into their own personal budgets. The bishopric was informed of these matters, but it took no measures, indicating that it is no stranger to this type of business. Then, within the bishopric, an Alcatel printing shop was opened where they copy books. There is no accounting of the resulting funds or into whose pockets the money flows, but the bishopric pays the rent and electricity for the business. They also print business forms for private companies so one can imagine the amount of money generated.

Nestor Vornicescu Brought Maidens to the Tismana Monastery Where Nicu Ceausescu Then Raped Them.

"The relationship between the archbishop and the Ceausescu family, and especially Nicu Ceausescu, was much more than close. The Oltenian archbishop twice brought maidens to the Tismana monastery where this vicious youngest Ceausescu son raped them right in the monastery. Afterwards, Nestor Vornicescu was visited daily by an entire army of 'blue eyes' who would leave with their car trunks filled. The direct contact between Nestor Vornicescu and the Ceausescu family was demonstrated on Romanian television on 12 January 1990 when it televised pictures of certain objects belonging to the bishopric found in Zoe Ceausescu's home. These were gifts given by Nestor to the dictator's daughter (even though the items did not belong to him).

"As has been mentioned before, what is of primary importance is that the St. Spiridon parish is linked to the Oltenian bishopric only through its beliefs; not administratively or economically. Thus I personally, and I am supported by the parish council and my parishioners as well as most of the priests, call for the resignation of Archbishop Nestor Vornicescu because of his flagrant abuses and violations even of the Penal Code. He must publicly admit his guilt and recognize that the time has come for his position to be filled by a true believer, a person devoted to the Orthodox Church and the vestments he wears.

"May God help us in this endeavor!"

Nestor Lives in a Harem With 10 Nuns.

"My name is Boroiu Nicolae. I am a judge by profession and I am a member of the parish council of the church of St. Spiridon of Oltenia. The church had been in a completely run-down condition prior to the arrival of Fr. Mladin. The courtyard was overgrown with weeds as the former priest, the late Fr. Grigore Romanescu, was preoccupied with the business of selling alcoholic beverages. Although the church was in a delapidated condition, Archbishop Vornicescu paid no attention to our parish's situation. After Fr. Mladin arrived, we, together with the parishioners, were able to

restore the church through donations. Today you can see that it is beautifully decorated, murals have been restored etc. If the activities of Fr. Mladin in this regard are meritorious, the same cannot be said of Archbishop Nestor Vornicescu who, unfortunately, is our present metropolitan. Many times over the years, I attended religious services at the Metropolitan Cathedral, St. Dumitru in Craiova. There was never an occasion, no matter how small, that the archbishop did not take the opportunity in his sermons to praise endlessly Nicolae Ceausescu and communism in general. He went so far that during a sermon in 1985 or 1986 when he was honored with the position of vice-chairman of the Christian Conference for Peace in Prague, (an organization infiltrated by the Kremlin) he called for workers in Holland to throw armored tanks into the sea.

"The current archbishop maintains close ties of friendship with Metropolitan Vladimir of Kishinev in Moldavia who opposes the unification of Romania with its ancient homeland of Bessarabia. He persecutes priests who declare themselves in favor of unification.

"Nestor Vornicescu did everything in his power to bring about the demolition of the Basilica of St. Ioan Sebastian in Craiova, a historical monument. It is a curious situation that although after December 1989 many things changed in Romania, in the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church one still finds the same fiddlers for that atheist regime, and the same signatories to the order for demolishing the basilica. We cannot at this time say that we have an Orthodox Church in Romania in the canonical sense, because the current church hierarchy was not named on its merits, or through a canonical election, but because of the pressure of a communist dictatorship. By canon law these individuals should be defrocked. There are more notorious issues. According to church law, the archbishop cannot live with women under the same roof. However, Nestor Vornicescu lives in the Oltenian bishopric (the former Voreoreanu palace) together with more than 10 nuns (including young nuns) a fact that cannot but provoke the legitimate suspicions of the faithful who are scandalized by this blatant immorality of Nestor Vornicescu. Furthermore, we are surprised that the archbishop was not called to account in criminal court for passing on the objects found in the domicile of Zoe Ceausescu; objects belonging to the Bishopric of Craiova and not to him personally. In Romanian law there is no provision which exempts high church officials from criminal prosecution."

A Sacerdotal Revolution?

The resignation or removal of His Holiness Nestor Vornicescu is the only viable solution for the Oltenian bishopric. "Who will arrange for his dismissal?" the Oltenian parishes ask. They have been offered the assistance of Democratic Convention senator from Dolj, Professor Aurelian Popescu, who will bring up the issue in Parliament.

Until then, people are waiting for the prosecutor's office and the Financial Guard to unravel the mess at the bishopric. Then, if it is necessary, one can add to the equation a

"sacerdotal uprising" in Oltenia. In other words, a new "December," shaped by God Himself, through his intermediaries in religious garb.

Controversial Cluj Mayor Defended as 'Great Patriot'

93BA0571A Bucharest *EUROPA* in Romanian
18-25 Jan 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ilie Neacsu: "Mr. Funar and Transylvania"]

[Text] It does not take a specialist of any sort to note the concentrated and concerted attacks made by certain proven anti-Romanian forces against the mayor of Cluj-Napoca, Mr. Gheorghe Funar. Among these forces, and at the head of the list, are: the UDMR [the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], the PNT-cd [the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], the PNL-AT [the National Liberal Party-Young Wing], the PER [Romanian Ecologist Party], and the FSN [National Salvation Front]; periodicals such as ROMANIA LIBERA, EVENIMENTELE ZILEI, EXPRES MAGAZIN, EXPRES, and "22"; and persons in the underground cultural life, such as the dues-paying members of the Freemasons Lodge and—certainly not last—members of the government and politicians who see themselves overshadowed by Gheorghe Funar's gutsy positions, courage, and popularity.

Although nearly everyone considers the position of the mayor of Cluj-Napoca to be perfectly legal, the jackals are showing their teeth, the hyenas are making noise, the writers in the employ of the Soros Foundation are using up hundreds of tons of paper and ink in order to satisfy their masters, our politicians are chuckling to themselves and, at the very same time, the country is gasping like an asthmatic patient. Anti-Romanian actions, planned both from within the country and abroad, can be seen with the naked eye without the need for a microscope or a magnifying glass.

Up until recently, EVENIMENTELE ZILEI praised Gheorghe Funar to such an extent that you would have believed that the Cluj-Napoca mayor owned at least as many shares in this newspaper as do FSN supporters Roman, Babiuc, and Severin. Recently, however, this biting anti-Romanian newspaper, headed by a spineless, but unequaled opportunist, has attacked Gheorghe Funar issue after issue. Certainly, Chief Editor Ion Cristoiu is not working on his own initiative, but rather in accordance with directions he receives from the big shots in the shadows, whom we all know. Well, has Cristoiu ever used his wishy-washy "revelations" on page one of EVENIMENTELE ZILEI to criticize Walter Roman's son, Petre Roman, or Severin, Gheorghe Bereceanu, Ion Aurel Stoica, Victor Babiuc, Doru Viorel or Dinu Patriciu? No way! They have had and still have the mission of offering all kinds of scandalous documents to Cristoiu in order to improve their own reputations. And, EVENIMENTELE ZILEI is not the only paper that plays this way. The foremost question is the following: Why are all these people and all these forces working to find fault with Gheorghe Funar and to bring him down?

The answer is simple: because Funar is a great patriot and people like Funar are mortal enemies of those who author

utopian schemes, plotters and mercenaries, traitors, and those who would sell out their own people.

What would be the consequences of the departure of Gheorghe Funar from his job as Cluj-Napoca mayor? I do not believe I would surprise anyone by saying that, if by some folly Funar was to resign as mayor, all of Transylvania would fall into the rapacious and bloody hands of the UDMR Horthyites. Certainly, Transylvania has numerous courageous and intelligent sons of the caliber of the current mayor of Cluj-Napoca, but many of them are standing in the shadows for fear of being labeled nationalist, communist, extremist, xenophobic, chauvinist, fascist, and so forth.

If Funar should fall, then the UDMR would become the main political force in Transylvania and would dictate to the overwhelming majority of the people. Romanian statues, monuments, and cemeteries would be desecrated, Horthyism would return, the Orthodox Church would shudder in the face of a Vatican offensive, and all of Transylvania would be shaken as if by an earthquake. At this hour, few people realize what a positive role Gheorghe Funar is playing in Romania.

The government could fall and so could the president, who is more than just an ornament, but Funar does not have the right to surrender his position to another. Cluj-Napoca is the heart of Transylvania and the second most important city in Romania. These are things that must be kept in mind by all Romanians in Transylvania, by all the leading intellectuals—regardless of their political beliefs—and by the workers, who, at this point in time, are being humbled as they were during the age of slavery and who are being shamed for the fact that in December 1989 they marched in the streets to shed their political identity and their jobs and to end up unemployed. The same is true for the wise and intelligence peasantry, who are the most authentic descendants of the Dacians, and, by no means last, for our military, regardless of the color of their uniforms.

Political regimes are short-lived, and they pursue nothing more than narrow interests. The basis for success must be the unification of all Romanians, regardless of their religious beliefs or political opinions. Otherwise, we Romanians become entangled in ephemeral discussions and do not act. All those around us and within our own country are organizing, they are voting unanimously, and they are taking care of their own dirty laundry. Only we are squandering our forces, and when a patriot like Funar wants to apply the country's Constitution and its other laws, we bury him. Do we not have enough ill-fated examples of our ambivalence throughout history? Have we learned nothing from the deaths of Vlad Tepes, Michael the Brave, Tudor Vladimirescu, Alexandru Ion Cuza, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Ion Antonescu, and Nicolae Ceausescu? True patriots have fallen one after another, and yet it is the dreadful people, traitors and incompetents, who live on. The death of Vlad Tepes meant subjugation, the murder of Michael the Brave led to the loss of national unity, the assassination of Tudor Vladimirescu destroyed the innate spirit of freedom, the dismissal of Cuza coincided with the bringing in of foreigners to lead the country, the elimination of Codreanu meant the chaining of the pure Romanian spirit, the

shooting of Antonescu dishonored the entire Romanian Army, and the legal masquerade by which Ceausescu was killed created anarchy, chaos, poverty, and discord. Furthermore, values were thrown out, stupidity rather than intelligence come to the forefront, our territorial integrity was placed under a question mark, the people who love our country are characterized as extremists, and traitors, quislings, and cowards—in a single word, the dregs—are in fashion.

All of the above, from Vlad Tepes to Ceausescu, fell because first and foremost they loved their people, and the crimes committed against them had their roots in foreign schemes and hands.

Now, the locust and vipers have pounced upon Gheorghe Funar. It seems that no sane person is asking about the people who are destroying the country's economy, about Roman, Severin, Dijmareescu and the other mediocrities. No one sees the people who are selling out the country from one end to another. I stop and wonder what our intelligence services have been doing for the last three years. They have not announced the elimination of a single spy ring, they have not arrested a single saboteur of the national economy, and they have not sent a single traitor behind bars. Or, perhaps, have all of these occupations become legal since Ceausescu's death? Do our intelligence services not know what the Freemasons are doing? I wonder.

Returning to the root of the problem, I consider it my duty, as a Romanian, to point out to the transitory responsible authorities that Funar is a pillar of granite in the path of the invaders and revisionists and that without him Transylvania will fall. If the interests of the current rulers are directed towards the disintegration of the country, then they can continue their "work" of harassing the mayor of Cluj-Napoca. In the not too distant future, we might also see Timisoara Mayor Oancea and Brasov Mayor Moruzzi among the ranks of the rulers. Nor can we exclude the possibility that we might see a conciliatory and enticing spirit from Cotroceni.

Commentary on CADA Founding Members' Press Conference

93BA0573B Bucharest *BARICADE* in Romanian
26 Jan 93 p 15

[Article by Doina Antonie: "CADA: The Truth—A Bridge Too Far"]

[Text] This February marks the third anniversary of the establishment of CADA, the Action Committee for Democratization of the Army. A press conference was held Monday, 18 January, by three of its founding members to mark this anniversary. Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Petru Litiu, pilot; Major (res.) Nicolae Durac; and Major (res.) Constantin Chitacaru. They were joined by Claudiu Iordache.

The general theme on which the officers (who are currently reservists) spoke was "The Need for CADA." It is well known that during the glory years of Ceausescu (whose execution many still regard as unfortunate), the Army was one of the most heavily indoctrinated institutions and that the dignity of those in uniform was trampled on. Now,

paradoxically, three years after the December 1989 Revolution (which for some has become "those events"), the Army, because of continuing inertia, still does not wish to become respectable. Keeping and promoting former Ceausescu henchmen into leadership jobs only means a sad continuation of the old cadre policy that places the Romanian officer at the mercy of his superiors, the glorious graduates of the Frunze Academy [Military Academy of former USSR].

It has never been part of CADA's intentions to cause harm to the institution of the Army, but only to transform it from an institution in the service of the government into a cohesive organization indisputably at the service of the Romanian people. CADA wished to define the professional and social status of the career officer and to modify promotion criteria (knowing that in the old regime this meant repayment for obedience to the Ceausescu policy).

Claudiu Iordache briefly reviewed the highlights of CADA's all-too-brief existence. The speaker went over a list of events and ended by pointing out that President Iliescu accused CADA of participating in the events of 13-15 June 1990 [Jiu Valley miners' riots] in order later to be able to recommend that it be abolished. In the highly politicized atmosphere of that year, the mere idea that the Army was again involved in politics horrified many people: As proof we have the reaction of a public enamored of the reelected president. I will mention in passing that a number of elite officers of the Romanian Army—pilots, parachutists, and representatives of the various traditional services—were at one point left to shiver in the cold in front of Victory Palace on 12-13 February, where they had come to request an interview with the Provisional National Unity Council president. The president, however, was in the throes of an attack of melomania, and had decided to attend a concert being conducted by Sergiu Celibidache—who at the time was accused of having been a member of the Iron Guard.

Although it was precisely CADA that had urged the depoliticization of the Army, CADA was outlawed because of accusations that it had a purely political purpose. Today we are paradoxically facing a situation in which there are officers who were promoted precisely from among the Ceausescu henchmen of earlier days—not to mention out-of-turn promotions which disregard military hierarchy and tradition. Even if an officer had been exceptionally gifted, for example, we cannot understand how it is possible that he could be promoted from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant general in just a two-three-year interval. According to documents presented at the press conference, General Cioflina was promoted out of turn, following which in September 1990 he convened all the unit cadres and recommended that they support Mr. Iliescu and at the same time accused the Timisoara Society of Iron Guardist actions. Now he is the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. Another example is General (ret.) Topliceanu. On 21 December 1989 on his order some army units stepped in at the Liberty Square in Cluj, where 29 people died.

Although we are far from intending to place the blame on "the entire Army," as we expect to hear this institution's press bureau reply, we would like to inform readers that the documents discussed during the CADA press conference

can offer answers to many questions bothering many people, many grieving parents, and people whose only fault was wishing to live in freedom.

Despite evident disagreements among these army cadre, we continue to hope that a careful and impartial analysis would not only shed light on this dark episode [the December Revolution] but would also shield an institution of the Romanian state from other accusations at a time when it perhaps has the greatest need for credibility. For the time being, it is precisely those young officers who had the courage to turn away their weapons when they were ordered to fire on their own brothers, who are enjoying that much-discussed credibility among large segments of public opinion. Let this serve as a warning!

Timis Commander on Arms Reductions, Preparedness

93BA0596B Timisoara *RENASTEREA BANATEANA*
in Romanian 17 Dec 92 p 5

[Interview with Major General Florin Mancu, commandant of Timisoara Garrison, by Mariana Cernicova; place and date not given: "We Will Be Able To Defend Our Country With the Patriotism Typical of Us Romanians and With the Resources We Have Available"]

[Text] [Cernicova] General, soon we will conclude the actions announced by the Ministry of National Defense for the period 23 November through 23 December, regarding the deactivation of certain weapons as a result of the Paris Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty—to which Romania is a party. What does this reduction mean for the Banat and for Timis County?

[Mancu] The army in Timis County is also included within the organizational structure of the Romanian Army. I cannot assess right now how or many of the armored vehicles in our inventory will be destroyed or dismantled, because this action is organized and coordinated at the central level, with details being communicated to us along the way. As called for in the Treaty's provisions, which are not secret, the reductions deal with five categories of military equipment: tanks, other types of armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters. As far as our country is concerned, artillery and helicopters will not be involved in the reductions, since our inventories are below the established limits. With regards to tanks, their numbers will be reduced from 1,600 to 1,375; for combat vehicles, the numbers will drop from 2,810 to 2,100; and for combat aircraft, from 532 to 430. The treaty we are discussing was ratified by the Romanian Parliament in Law No. 18 of 4 March 1992, and it is natural for us to move to fulfill our obligations.

[Cernicova] Prior to the start of these activities, we were visited by experts and underwent inspections at various levels. Could you review these contacts for us?

[Mancu] After the signing of the treaty, the inspections that took place in our country also involved Timis County. This year, we received a multinational inspection team composed of Americans, French, Germans, Russians, and Bulgarians, led, however, by the Americans. Later, we had an

experimental inspection, a training inspection, at Lugoj and Caransebes, carried out by a commission of experts from our neighbors—here I am talking about the Hungarian army. Finally, we had a visit from a joint Spanish and Portuguese commission. Probably after the conclusion of the equipment-destruction phase, we will learn how to implement the treaty's provisions.

[Cernicova] Will not this reduction of military equipment lead to a weakening of our defense preparedness or to the substitution of equipment that is outdated, from a technical performance point of view, with equipment that is improved?

[Mancu] From the military preparedness point of view, the reduction does not pose a problem, because the military equipment we will retain is sufficient to provide for the defense of the country. In accordance with our military doctrine, we are prepared for defensive actions, not for offensive ones. Additionally, there are compensatory measures concerning the strengthening of our military preparedness through improvements in the professional training of the armed forces by integrating our country in Euro-Atlantic organizations and in their military organizations, as well as in continental, regional and subregional alliances that provide for security, and through the retention of a core group of specialists during the period of converting certain units of the defense industry to civilian production. With regards to the second part of your question, it is no secret that a large portion of our military equipment comes from our neighbors to the east. It is true that some categories of weapons date back to WWII. They are virtually obsolete. But, we are obligated to maintain what we do have, to train, and to know how to use the equipment under any circumstances. With the patriotism typical of us Romanians and with the resources we have available—fear not!—we will be able to defend the country.

[Cernicova] The United States has promised our Hungarian neighbors substantial assistance with regards to military training and equipment. Our country and the United States have concluded an agreement for officer training. Will this be followed by assistance in the area of equipment, too?

[Mancu] I wouldn't know. Our neighbors probably had the advantage of starting such contacts earlier. I do not think, however, that an imbalance will be created between us and the Hungarians or that we will be placed at a disadvantage.

[Cernicova] In a world filled with tensions and with the nearness to our borders of certain areas where fighting is taking place, it has been suspected that Romania sold weapons either to the Moldovans or to the Serbs. Knowing full well that it is not the responsibility of unit commanders to deal with such questions, how can we, nonetheless, counteract such rumors, which have not done us any good.

[Mancu] We Romanians certainly have not sold weapons to anyone and what has been written about us is false, if not the result of ill-will on the part of those who have accused us of such things. It is true that, as a unit commander, I do not know in detail what is happening at the ministry-level, but Romania's position in this area has been more than clear.

We have no reason to give arms to others. The arms we do have we use for our own training.

[Cernicova] In the future, do you foresee our participation within the framework of United Nations forces on various peacekeeping missions? More precisely, do you think we will be asked to intervene in the former Yugoslavia?

[Mancu] In the not too distant past, you know, we took part in the Persian Gulf War, even though the number of Romanians involved was small. For the future, let us allow the future to decide. I know one thing: Relations between the Romanian Army and NATO are promising. I do not think, however, that we will be asked to intervene in Yugoslavia, especially since we are neighbors and that could easily provoke questions of a different nature. But, that is my personal opinion and I ask that you consider it as such.

* Nuclear Plant Safety, Projected Output Discussed

93BA0580A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER* in Romanian 13, 15 Jan 93

[Interview in two installments with Ionel Bucur and Viorel Marculescu, directors of the Cernavoda Nuclear Plant Project, by Dumitru Manolache; place and date not given: "No Atomic Bomb Will Explode..."]

[13 Jan pp 1, 2]

[Text] Considering that the Cernavoda Nuclear Plant [CNC] represents one of our largest economic investments and that its operation will significantly contribute to the country's electric power production, we felt it would appropriate to inform our readers about its current stage of construction, the safety measures taken in case of accident at the plant, as well as other details of the activities conducted there. That is why we addressed ourselves to the directors of that major installation, Ionel Bucur and Viorel Marculescu, who were kind enough to speak to us.

[Manolache] Gentlemen, could you tell us about the current stage of the CNC project?

[Bucur] A new contract has been signed between Renel and Aeci Ansaldo, which stipulates completion of construction and installation at Unit 1, starting the plant under the responsibility of the consortium, training 100 Romanian specialists at a similar plant in Canada, and initial operation for one and one-half years under the responsibility of the foreign partner. In the contract, the operation period of the first unit was accepted by the partner as December 1994. In June-July 1991, until the contract between Renel and the consortium was signed, Unit 1 was about 58-59 percent completed. I want to point out that the objective of the contract was work completion at Unit 1, verification and maintenance at Unit 2, and maintenance at Units 3-5. The contract also included a credit of \$410 million advanced by one bank in Canada and another in Italy. In addition, Renel ordered a study (Bosard) paid through a PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland Hungary] program, to outline a plan for the development of the national power system during this transition period and up to the year 2000. The study will show that work on the first Cernavoda unit must

definitely be continued and completed; that financial resources must be found to continue activities at the second unit; that work on Units 3-5 must be continued after 2000 as a function of the nation's economic growth and of power demands from our neighbors; as well as other data regarding plants that operate inefficiently with low output. Immediately after the contract was signed, we undertook a mobilization program at Cernavoda: we created a plant management team that will include 300 Canadian specialists and 450-500 Romanian employees, whose role will be to support this team and to learn how to coordinate and operate such a plant. For the other units, we expect to carry out this coordination with a much smaller number of foreign specialists. This joint team currently has 250 Canadians and 350 Romanians. Together with this organization and implementation initiatives, we continued our construction activities. At the present time, we finished 68-69 percent of the project on the first unit. This means that construction work is more than 95 percent completed.

[Marulescu] 70 percent of the mechanical installation, and more than 25 percent of the electrical and other installations. As a result, the starting date for the first unit—end of December 1994—remains valid and we believe that we can achieve it.

[Manolache] What will be CNC's contribution to the country's electric power production?

[Bucur] More than 10 percent of the country's electric power needs will be met by Unit 1 at Cernavoda. During the first part of 1992 we conducted one important task, pressure testing of the reactor building with all the nuclear systems inside it, which was completed successfully.

[Marulescu] The test showed that the structure behaved satisfactorily and that it returned—if we must say so—to its initial volume after the test.

[Bucur] I also want to say that we powered up the 100-kilowatt station that, for practical purposes, supplies the national system unit.

[Marulescu] Normally, when the reactor is stopped, it must be supported with power from the national system. We were able to test the pumps—which for the first time were made in Romania—used to cool the turbine condenser. The test was conducted here, on site, in a closed loop, and we were glad to see that things went very well.

[Manolache] A complex installation such as this one would obviously be faced with a rather serious danger in case of a nuclear accident. People still have vivid memories of Chernobyl. In this respect, what can you tell us about the reactor's safety system?

[Bucur] We have several radiation safeguard barriers that prevent radioactivity from spreading into the environment. From the standpoint of the radiation source (the fuel—natural Uranium 235) a first barrier is that it is a solid, in the form of a carbocif [translation unknown] pellet. As a solid, it does not change its shape during fission, except if it is defective. These pellets are placed into zirconium tubes called fuel rods, which are hermetically sealed at both ends. Should some of the pellets become deformed, the products

that emit radiation remain in the tube; this is the second radiation safeguard barrier. Thirty-seven of these rods form an assembly; these assemblies are placed into pressure tubes called fuel channels; twelve assemblies form a fuel channel. The channels are interconnected in a closed, hermetic system, called the primary heat transportation system. This is the third radiation safeguard barrier.

[Marulescu] The fourth barrier is the concrete shell itself, and the fifth barrier is the exclusion zone, a circle with a radius of one kilometer whose center is the center of the reactor. The only activities allowed in this circle are those of the plant.

[Bucur] In order to discuss safeguard systems, I want to make a rather prosaic comparison between a nuclear plant and a conventional plant: in a conventional plant, the energy source is the boiler. When the fire is out, the energy also stops. In a nuclear plant, the energy source is the reactor: in this case, even if the reactor is turned off for some time period, it continues to emit thermal energy, which must be captured even after the shut down. That is why systems have been designed to capture this remaining heat.

[15 Jan pp 1, 8]

[Marulescu] We probably should mention the shutoff systems, as well as safety and post-security. The reactor has two shutoff systems: one with 28 vertical shutdown rods, which stop the nuclear reaction when they are rapidly lowered; and the "poison" injection shutoff system (a neutron absorber: gadolinium nitrate). These are completely independent of one another. There are also other special safety systems: for instance, the rod injection system in the active zone, which operates in case of a serious accident, such as rupture of a collector in the primary circuit. In this case, water is injected into the reactor to capture the heat, as my colleague has already mentioned. I should point out that a normal cooling system operates when the reactor is shut down. The safety systems operate only in case of accident.

[Bucur] Let us assume that a large conduit has broken inside this concrete cylinder; boiling water will then be created and raise the pressure. This would trigger the sprinkler system in the shell, consisting of 1720 heads that spray cold water from the pool located between the two shells of the reactor, cooling the steam and lowering the pressure; the pool has a capacity of 3,000 cubic meters of water. The cooling pumps have electric power systems. We have a conventional power system (class III) which provides power to our users even if the national power system fails, and which consists of diesel generators. And if this class III system fails to operate in case of an accident, we have the so-called emergency power, consisting of two separate diesel generators designed to withstand earthquakes; they supply all the installations that must operate to cool the reactor.

[Marulescu] There are also other safeguard systems: emergency water supply...

[Bucur] What we need is water. Assuming that a disaster occurs on the Danube, we have provided sufficient capacity to cool the reactor.

[Marculescu] And since we do not want to hide anything, we'll tell you that start-up of the first unit depends on the success of acceptance tests for these 8-megawatt diesel generators, which did not pass the first trials. If they do not pass their tests, we will have to consider importing them. It is a source of concern.

[Manolache] The press has mentioned the social problems that face the CNC personnel. What can you tell us about that?

[Bucur] Cernavoda was a very significant objective during the past regime. Together with construction plans, there were organization plans for the work site: it was estimated that a settlement of 3,600 workers would have to be established. As the work proceeded, and with a poor understanding of the situation, all sorts of people were brought here: draftees, soldiers, temporary workers, all in all a very poorly qualified work force. And so, this settlement, which should have had a maximum of 4,000 people, ended up having 17,000 by the time of the Revolution! You can imagine how they were housed! Not to mention their quality! Many of those who were brought here either didn't have a job or were sent because their plants wanted to get rid of them. You can imagine what they did: they destroyed, they stole, and the settlement was pathetic. Immediately after the Revolution we reduced the personnel to about 10,000 people. Without money, we continued the activity at a more reduced pace. Right now, there are slightly over 5,000 people at the work site. We expect that this number will drop to 3,000 during the next year.

[Marculescu] There are still people in the settlement who have been unemployed for years, have no housing, and are staying because they have nowhere else to go. In January of last year about 52 families were "inherited" from the time of the Canal project.

[Bucur] Immediately after the Revolution, what we did was to destroy all these barracks, we cleaned the area. We left standing only the buildings that were in good condition, in which we tried to improve living conditions. In order to assure a standard of living as normal as possible, we started and conducted a program to organize the town of Cernavoda; the apartment houses you see in the town are one

result. The program also provided for a hospital, a movie house, a club, and several stores. But after the Revolution no more program! The budget no longer allocated any money. We therefore appealed to Renel, and with the help of the unions, we managed to convince the Romanian government to approve a social program that included the construction of housing for operating personnel, child care centers, stores, a food market, improvements in the drinking water system, as well as the construction of a hospital and of a bridge over the canal. These were done primarily under the Stolojan Government.

[Marculescu] The social program was last estimated at 30 billion, with 12 billion expected from the budget and 18 from Renel.

[Bucur] What did we achieve: Approvals took more than six months. We started using the child care center and the kindergarten, we built a food-store site, and after many negotiations we started to raze the old high school while starting construction on a new one and of a school with 24 classrooms.

[Marculescu] More than half of the heating network is currently completed.

[Bucur] We have 100 apartments under construction. We have opened 19 of them and we are about to open 19 more in another unit; the whole complex will be opened in January-February. We have also completed documentation for another 100 apartments in buildings that we bought at the structural construction stage. We have started installing the drinking water system. Another 400 service apartments for our workers are under construction. We are also contemplating the construction of private homes, which will categorically change the standard of living. We have thus crossed all the difficult bridges, but the problem is that we do not have very much money. In 1992, the budget gave us 20 billion lei; Renel was supposed to make up the difference to 45 billion, and it did, but the problem is that it also has to receive just about that much from its consumers. It is possible that the currency will enter the country, because the credits are draining away, and we have problems with lei! Let us hope that the new government will continue the reform and will give us the money we need to complete all the projects that we have undertaken.

Kosovo

Chairman of Kosovo Republic Assembly Interviewed

93BA0601A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 4 Feb 93
pp 17-19

[Interview with Iljaz Ramajli, chairman of Kosovo Republic Assembly, by Mirce Tomovski; place and date not given: "The Albanians Do Not Want War"]

[Text] *Iljaz Ramajli is chairman of the illegal assembly of the so-called Kosovo Republic. Ramajli does not accept either description—illegal and so-called. He is constantly moving, either in what was formerly Yugoslav area or abroad. According to him, this is due to his position as well as the fact that he is being wrongly persecuted by the authorities of the Republic of Serbia as president of the "assembly" which proclaimed the existence of the state of "Republic of Kosovo." By profession he is a lawyer and is not a member of any political party in Kosovo.*

[PULS] Mr. Ramajli, who do you actually represent, from the viewpoint of the function you perform?

[Ramajli] I express the will of the Albanian people, who elected the assembly at the legal 1989 elections, when such elections were held throughout the former Yugoslavia. The assembly proclaimed the "Declaration of Independence" on 2 August and the "Kosovo Republic" on 7 September 1990, in Kacanik. Since then, we have been on the run, for the Serbian authorities accused us and are wrongly persecuting us simply because we preferred the political will of the people of Kosovo and drafted the "Kosovo Republic Constitution," based on the then valid resolutions of the Constitution of the Kosovo SAP [Socialist Autonomous Province] and the former Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, on 24 May 1992, multiparty elections were held. Since the Serbian occupation authorities did not allow the assembly to meet in Pristina, the assembly has not met as yet. However, the assembly, of which I am the chairman, is still constitutionally extant, as long as no new assembly has been elected and new authorities appointed.

[PULS] With a view to the circumstances you described, how is your assembly functioning? Are there any other authorities and how do they operate?

[Ramajli] The 110 delegates did not accept the suspension proclaimed by the Serbian National Assembly. For example, they resolved that a referendum be held in Kosovo (as an independent and autonomous state), that multiparty elections be held, and that an agreement be reached with the political parties for setting up a multiparty transitional government. Such a government was established in 1991. Its prime minister is Mr. Bukosi, who represents the Kosovo Democratic Alliance. No new assembly was constituted, for it was prevented by the Serbian authorities. Nonetheless, we would not like to give the Serbian authorities the opportunity illegally to persecute its delegates. We shall constitute an assembly in the presence of outside forces and observers.

[PULS] How are the activities of that assembly and the other authorities financed?

[Ramajli] Some of the funds come from our citizens who work abroad, as voluntary contributions. However, we have already regulated all this. Every citizen of the Kosovo Republic who works abroad and, naturally, would like to do so, contributes three percent of his income to the Kosovo Fund. This fund is controlled by the government. It is used to meet the social costs of Kosovo as well as costs of education and the state authorities.

[PULS] Have you established contacts with representatives of other countries or international community institutions?

[Ramajli] There is no international forum by which we have not been accepted as a delegation of the Kosovo Republic Assembly: the European Parliament, the Economic Community, the Commission for Europe, and many European countries. Representatives of our government and our Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been received by representatives of international and national institutions throughout Europe. For example, a UN resolution on the deployment of United Nations forces stipulates that they must be deployed on the territory "along the border between Serbia and the Kosovo Republic." We interpret this as meaning that the international community does not recognize Serbian jurisdiction over Kosovo as a whole and that Kosovo is considered a separate entity.

[PULS] You say that Kosovo is an independent and autonomous state. What do you mean by that?

[Ramajli] After the referendums that were held in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, as being federal units within the former Yugoslavia, we, as a structural element of that federation, believed that we had the right to proclaim the Republic of Kosovo as an independent and autonomous state. We did not reject the idea of the creation of an association of states, naturally, on the basis of a different political constellation. However, the development of the situation was such that we held a referendum and proclaimed Kosovo an independent and autonomous state. We took this step because Serbian propaganda kept accusing Albanians in the territory of former Yugoslavia, i.e., outside Albania, that they wanted to have a single country. We wanted to prove that this was not our objective and, in order not to be considered counterproductive in terms of the views of the international community concerning borders, we proclaimed the Kosovo Republic as a state which would be separate both from Serbia and from Albania. Therefore, in a way, it would be a neutral country.

[PULS] Could this be merely a temporary decision prior to the creation of a Greater Albania?

[Ramajli] I would not say that this is the dream of Greater Albania, for Albanians have never had such a dream. They believe that it is natural for any nation to live as a single entity within a single state. At the same time, however, they are aware of the fact that it is impossible to accomplish this with the present deployment of forces in the international community. We believe that this will take place in the future, according to the principles of a united Europe. At that point the unification of the Albanians will be achieved without any changes in national borders and without the use of force.

[PULS] In that case, how are we to interpret the open letter addressed by Academician Redzep Tjosja to Albanian President Berisha, in which he attacked him sharply because of the nonfulfillment of the dream of the Albanians to live within the same ethnic state? Is that not a dream of Greater Albania?

[Ramajli] My view is that this is the thinking of a single individual and that anyone has the right to think whatever he wants and share his thoughts. However, the tremendous majority of Albanians in Kosovo support, for the time being, the step of proclaiming Kosovo a neutral and independent state.

[PULS] However, some time ago, the former Danish minister of foreign affairs Elman Jansen expressed the view of the European Community that the autonomy of Kosovo is supported within the framework of Serbia. This means that the international community does not support your concept of the Kosovo Republic.

[Ramajli] The fact is that some public statements made by representatives of the European Community and of individual countries clearly state that they do not support the establishment of a Kosovo Republic. However, Europe is concerned with maintaining its own peace, which can be seen in what it failed to do concerning the recognition of Macedonia, for the sake of preserving the peace. The same applies to Kosovo. Europe and the Serbs themselves know that Kosovo is lost to Serbia. This can be seen also in the suggestion made by the Yugoslav president on dividing Kosovo between Albania and Serbia.

[PULS] When and where was this stated officially?

[Ramajli] According to our information, this was told by Tjositj to Vance and Owen in Geneva. This means that the prevailing thought in Serbia is that Kosovo is not an indivisible part of it. That is why they are probably preparing for the division of Kosovo.

[PULS] How would it be divided?

[Ramajli] Part of Kosovo and Opstina Petj would go to Serbia and Montenegro; the other part would go to Albania. I can say that no one in Kosovo would accept such a division. One could speak only of Kosovo townships in which the majority of the population is Serb—the Leposavitj and Zubin Potok Opstinas. No serious political force in Kosovo is in favor of splitting it between Serbia and Albania. In the final account, it is the Kosovo Albanians who can speak for Kosovo!

[PULS] It is being said that, nonetheless, the main motor for all such, let us call them political, games is located in Tirana and not in Kosovo. What kind of relations do you maintain with Tirana?

[Ramajli] The motor for all that is taking place in Kosovo is in Kosovo. Our relations with Tirana are natural. They are close, for we have the same interests. We are working to promote the interests of a single nation. I believe that Tirana will always support and encourage whatever the Albanians in Kosovo decide concerning their fate. Naturally, we will always ask for the opinion of all Albanians, in Tirana,

Skopje, Titograd, or anywhere else. However, we shall make the decisions ourselves and such decisions will have to be respected by all. Being the mother country of the Albanians, Albania recognized the Republic of Kosovo as an independent and autonomous state. We are dealing with a single nation that was split into two parts by force. We maintain close ties with Albania, which is interested in preventing a conflict in Kosovo. It is interested in achieving the international recognition of the Republic of Kosovo peacefully and on the basis of talks.

[PULS] How then can we interpret the statement by Mr. Berisha, recently made at a NATO meeting in Brussels, and his fundamental view that "the human and civil rights of Albanians must be democratically guaranteed wherever Albanians live, but that borders must not be changed...."

[Ramajli] That President Berisha said this is a fact. However, he also mentioned the right to self-determination. This implies the right of Albanians to support an independent and autonomous state. The Kosovo Albanians will never surrender the right to have their own state. I am sure that they will choose no other way to accomplish this other than that of discussions and agreements with the other side and a peaceful solution. We shall never give up this right. I personally do not believe that in the long run Serbia would be able to treat Kosovo as it does and to keep its share of Kosovo by political and military force. This is impossible both economically and politically, for such an attitude would, in my view, lead to a variety of steps to be taken by the international community. The somewhat more open discussions that are taking place within Serbia itself, as well as the Tjositj suggestion of splitting of Kosovo indicate that the unraveling of the Kosovo knot is becoming apparent.

[PULS] What is the attitude of the Albanians concerning the position and opposition within Serbia?

[Ramajli] We have always stressed that the Kosovo issue must be resolved on the basis of a dialogue. Naturally, we have always insisted that this be done in the presence of international representatives, for we believe that guarantees are needed for whatever is agreed upon and implemented. Based on our previous experience with the Serbian authorities, we know that agreements have never been respected and have even been changed by force. The way we see it, there is little difference between the position and the opposition concerning Kosovo. The opposition cannot formulate its own views and radical policy toward Kosovo publicly and clearly, for there is a national homogeneity in Serbia concerning the Kosovo problems. Anyone who may speak differently would lose in Serbia, in the political meaning of the term. Therefore, conditions have not been created for an open and objective debate concerning Kosovo, although some people have raised this issue. We believe that the opposition should be more clear and more open on the subject of Kosovo and of a dialogue with the Albanians.

[PULS] Do you not consider that in a certain way this has already been done by Mr. Panic?

[Ramajli] The impression is that Panic tried to do something. However, what came out was that he was doing this

more for his own personal sake, than on the basis of any real political and functional power seriously to undertake the unraveling of the Kosovo knot. It subsequently became clear that, actually, he had no real power whatsoever in Serbia itself and that he was treated there as a foreigner.

[PULS] Do you not think that in a certain way you too have contributed to this by not participating in the elections?

[Ramajli] We could not participate in the elections for the majority of Kosovo citizens declared themselves in favor of the Kosovo Republic and in that country we already held elections. Voting for the Serbian parliament would mean abandoning our option of statehood. On the union level, however, the union leader, Panic, or the opposition should have discussed with the Albanians and reached an agreement on the nature of relations to be established after the elections. They failed to do that.

[PULS] However, Panic proclaimed himself your candidate as well.

[Ramajli] Other than making a request, he said nothing. Panic, in any case, is not the type of personality who could say something and implement it.

[PULS] You have repeatedly used the term occupation in mentioning the Serbian authorities. You are still part of the territory of Serbia and the Union Republic of Yugoslavia!

[Ramajli] Yugoslavia has collapsed and all federal units have proclaimed their independence, and so did Kosovo. That is why the political and military forces in Kosovo are considered by the people as forces of occupation and they behave in that manner.

[PULS] It is being said that there is terrorism practiced by the Albanian side, with ethnic cleansing, and so on.

[Ramajli] This is a worn-out Serbian formula. That is what was always being said about the Albanians. Today, however, this cannot be supported by a single case. Such justifications are ridiculous. We can prove that there have been no attacks by Albanians on police patrols but that unarmed Albanians have been shot at. It is generally known that we have neither paramilitary forces nor weapons. How could we, considering such a strong military and political control! There are paramilitary formations in Kosovo: those of Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan, Seselj, and the "White Eagles." This has been clearly seen by international observers.

[PULS] You have repeatedly stressed that you favor a peaceful way, a dialogue. How can this be achieved? Have any indications been given by the other side?

[Ramajli] No such indications have been received from the Serbian side. They stubbornly cling to the view that Kosovo is Serbian and that they will keep it all costs. However, they have repeated this so frequently that they have begun to realize that this was unrealistic. Why is it that they call for respecting the principle of self-determination for the peoples of Croatia and now Bosnia but do not apply the same principle to Kosovo? I believe that they could sit down and talk. We are aware of how important Kosovo is to the Serbs. We have repeatedly expressed our readiness to grant Serbs in Kosovo all the rights granted to the Albanians. This

would include the extra-territorial nature of historical, cultural, and religious sites. This way the Serbs would be guaranteed the preservation of part of their history, and we believe that Kosovo would remain neutral in terms of Serbia and Albania. Furthermore, it would be demilitarized. Serbia could accept such a solution if it abandoned its military option. This was known before the elections, and had the present regime lost the elections, it would have used Kosovo as a fuse and as an argument for new national homogenization. After Milosevic's electoral victory, the tension somewhat diminished. However, this is not to say that a conflict is excluded.

[PULS] It seems that of late there has been a split in the thinking between Albanian political parties and their leaders: An example is the disagreement among Tjosja, Rugova, and Dematji. What is its essence?

[Ramajli] I am not concerned with the split along some political lines in Kosovo. If we favor democracy and a different way of thinking, we must become accustomed to the fact that people could think differently. I believe that this would not break up the homogeneous nature of the Albanians. I do not accept the radicalizing which is being suggested as a way of changing the policy pursued so far.

[PULS] Still, it is a question of some general issues, something which is surprising given the strongly homogenized nature of the Albanians and their political parties.

[Ramajli] There have always been different ways of looking at the options supported by the Albanians. This has now come to the fore, for it is obvious that there is a misunderstanding in the international community concerning the Albanian demands. At the last meeting between Mr. Rugova and Eagleburger it was said that "the Americans are not interested in having the Albanians abandon the option of having a Kosovo Republic." It was diplomatically said that we must not abandon our views and we interpret this as a signal that there is an open door to the idea of a having a Kosovo Republic as a Balkan state.

[PULS] In that case, how can you include within this context the polemic between Berisha and Tjosja?

[Ramajli] I said that everyone has the right to think and speak as he wishes. Tjosja did this his own way, which I do not accept. However, the majority of Albanians are in favor of a Kosovo Republic, and if the international community would express a different view, I believe that the forces that support Tjosja will be in the majority. At that point this will become a much broader problem, for it will become a question of Albanians who are outside the boundaries of the state. I believe that instead of attacking the Albanians, each one of their demands should be considered seriously and resolved in a civilized political way if one would like to avoid any incident in this area, something which most of us do not wish to happen. Otherwise, if people start imposing on the Albanians something they do not want, I believe that quite quickly the option supported by Tjosja will prevail, calling for all Albanians to be united within a single country. I do not support such an option. The integration of the Albanians can come only through the integration of all of Europe.

[PULS] You have repeatedly stressed the problem of self-determination and statehood for the Albanian people. What are the guarantees that if this position is accepted and this status is achieved it would not be used for separatist purposes such as, for instance, the establishment of some political-territorial entities and autonomous areas, such as the proclamation of the existence of "Ilyrida" in Macedonia?

[Ramajli] If you are referring to the Albanians in Macedonia, in that case I believe that it would be in their interest for Macedonia to be an independent and autonomous state, as it is now. It is natural for the Albanians to wish to live within a single state, although it would be very difficult to establish an ethnic state. This concept was adopted in Serbia, for all Serbs to live within a single state, and we saw the tragic outcome of this idea. That is why we persistently wish to prove that we are not struggling for this. The Albanians in Macedonia clearly let it be known that they accept the Republic of Macedonia as their own independent and autonomous state. Albanians in Serbia and in Montenegro would like to be guaranteed all the rights based on international laws. We do not aspire for the creation of a single state for all Albanians. As to Ilyrida, I am not familiar with all the details. I see that the serious political entities in Macedonia, who represent the Albanians, have not spoken out in favor of such a republic. They participate in the political life of that united state, in its parliament, and in its government. They would like to be a nation with statehood within Macedonia and know better than anyone else what views to accept concerning that Ilyrida.

[PULS] Would it be dangerous to meanwhile mark borders?

[Ramajli] That is one phase that precedes fighting. I believe that in the future we could reach some kind of unity, a union among Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bulgaria. Economically, Macedonia leans toward Albania and vice versa. I believe that that is how matters will develop once passions have cooled off. This is of interest to the Albanians and the Macedonians. For otherwise, for a long time into the future Macedonia will have to remain squeezed between the interests of Greece and Serbia, which, unquestionably, coincide.

[PULS] The creation of unions within still-unconsolidated political relations in Europe, and especially in the Balkans, is a delicate issue. Furthermore, in terms of their political dimension, I believe that this would be unprofitable.

[Ramajli] I am, above all, in favor of a kind of customs union based on economic interests and not political in the least. We are all small nations that are aspiring to become big countries. This is our misfortune. I conventionally spoke of a union based, above all, on economic interests.

[PULS] What is your view on the entire set of issues related to Macedonia?

[Ramajli] I believe that this proves the principle-mindedness of the international community. According to the Badinter Commission, Macedonia was one of the two former Yugoslav republics that met all the prerequisites for being accepted by the international community. However, to begin with, the economic community did not take this

step, for it was waiting for peace to prevail in its own house, taking reactions in Macedonia into consideration. Recognition may be delayed but not forever. Objective views stipulate that if you are waiting for acceptance, this ground may be unstable. I do not believe that it will be the Macedonians but some foreign interests that will set the grounds for and stage various conflicts in Macedonia. Fortunately, it appears that the Security Council will suggest to the General Assembly to recognize Macedonia under a provisional name. This would clarify a number of issues and could reduce tension. Otherwise, I believe that anyone should be entitled to his name.

As to internal issues, a great deal of patience is necessary. Things may not change within a single day and what are needed are tolerance, understanding, and greater reciprocal trust. I cannot see prospects for an independent and autonomous Macedonia if not everyone feels equal and satisfied. Otherwise we would reach a situation similar to that of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Generally speaking, I believe that an agreement will be reached and that there will be internal mutual trust in Macedonia among all its subjects. Naturally, this requires time and patience.

[PULS] How do you cooperate with Albanians and with their political parties in Macedonia?

[Ramajli] The political parties in Kosovo maintain good relations with the political parties in Macedonia. Our assembly maintains good contacts with virtually all assemblies in the former Yugoslavia and we would like to establish contacts with the Macedonian Assembly as well on the governmental level. For the time being, we have no such contacts.

[PULS] Recently, more frequent statements have been heard to the effect that we are on the brink of war in Kosovo.

[Ramajli] It is a fact that war is on the threshold of Kosovo. However, this is not by our fault. Throughout all this time, the Serbian authorities have been preparing to initiate such an action. I believe that, nonetheless, the Serbs would not like to have matters reach a state of conflict in Kosovo, for this does not suit their interests. Had they wanted it, there would have been war. However, this does not mean that in the future matters would not come to that, if it suits them. The Albanians do not want war. However, if it comes to war, we shall be forced to defend ourselves. In that case I am convinced that not only the Albanians in Kosovo but the Albanians in other territories they inhabit, including Albania, will become involved. This means that if it comes to war in Kosovo Albania will have to intervene.

[PULS] Therefore, what is your projection on resolving such complex issues?

[Ramajli] If talks within the framework of the conference on Yugoslavia yield results, and if the war does not shift from Bosnia to Kosovo, I believe that the Kosovo issue will be discussed as part of the conference on Yugoslavia. These discussions will be long-lasting and difficult, and a kind of transitional period may be accepted.

Macedonia

Problems of Ethnic Serbs in Macedonia Analyzed

93BA0536A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 21 Jan 93
pp 12-13

[Article by Mirche Tomovski: "Kuceviste: Landing of the Heavenly People"]

[Text] *The performance in Kuceviste, with all the recognizable and malleable manufactured political folklore, is moving the DPS [Democratic Party of Serbs] and its leaders away from the statements about the autonomy and indigenous nature of the party, the civil and democratic platform, and readiness for dialogue.*

The loudly proclaimed Serbian assembly in the Skopje suburb of Kuceviste, attended by people from all parts of Macedonia—from the Skopje, Kumanovo, Gostivar, Ohrid-Porec, and Vardar regions—ended in the manner of already familiar local community theater: several heart-rending ethnic performances, euphoric reactions by the hard-core enthusiasts, and thoughtful, wondering observation of the assembled guests by the people of Kuceviste. But this theatrical atmosphere of folk festival and news conference by representatives of the Democratic Party of Serbs and of the Association of Serbs and Montenegrins in Macedonia does highlight two constant features: stubborn insistence on the alleged discrimination against and disenfranchisement of the Serbian population of Macedonia and demands for constitutional changes in the status of this population as a constituent ethnic group of the country. Those in office to blame for the allegedly unequal situation of Serbs in Macedonia are the leader of the government (read Kiro Gligorov) and the police. The aim of Macedonian government policy, according to the DPS, is deliberate elimination of Serbs as a group and constant mistreatment through violation of their human and civil rights and freedoms. As facts supporting their assertions they cite the 31 December incidents in the suburb of Kuceviste caused by the removal of the pictures of Seselj, Milosevic, Arkan, and the flag of the former SFRY, the incident of escorting of recruits to the railroad station, the events in Banjani, Kumanovsko, and so forth. On this occasion newspapermen had handed out to them a statement entitled "The Current Situation of Serbs in Macedonia," signed by the president of the DPS in Macedonia, Prof. Dr. Boro Ristic, whose title and position incidentally indicate the extent of discrimination against Serbs and him personally.

Neither the written demands, the news conference, nor the meeting are to be construed as radical. As a matter of fact, the Macedonian political public has grown accustomed to such political festivals, which are becoming events in the folklore of our democracy, especially since citizens of Macedonia are involved. The question of political literacy is something else again, and whether we like it or not this is part of our primitive stage of development, in which serious qualifications are claimed without substantiation and personal integrity is mercilessly denigrated, or a concession is demanded as the price for beginning dialogue. The most typical aspect of this process is the behavior of the second-ranking official of the DPS, Dobrivoje Tomic, in his reply to

the question of what will happen if the demands of the Serbs in Macedonia are not met. According to Tomic, "the natural thing then is to demand and to count on protection by the mother country, Serbia, and to hold a referendum of Serbs and Montenegrins in Macedonia on independent organization and self-protection."

If such statements are placed in a longer sequence of events, in which a prominent place is occupied by proclamation of the so-called Serbian Republic of Vardar Banovina, then many people rightly have much to ponder. An already known tale (admittedly one of relatively late date) of allegedly heaven-blessed people, buttressed by "historical data" on the 1,400 years of existence of Serbs in this region and on the current situation of the 300,000 Serbs in Macedonia, is well on its way to being reprinted for the purpose of manipulating people who already know best how their life is and if they are really deprived of rights in Macedonia. A prominent part in this process of increasing ethnic awareness is currently played by the producers of Serbian radio and television broadcasting in Pristina.

The demands of the democratic party of Serbs, voiced on behalf of all Serbs in Macedonia, are absolutely legitimate. This is part of the Macedonian democratic climate, which tolerates even the most extreme proposals. The Serbs in Macedonia are citizens of this country. The DPS is a legally registered party, and there is nothing bad about its demands as a subject for debate in the Macedonian parliament. It must be noted, though, that the euphoria over the demands ending last week in Kuceviste is a result of the silence of the current government. Hence the dialogue between the Macedonian authorities and representatives of the Serbs in Macedonia has been opened in Geneva through the offices of the European commissioner for minority rights in Europe, Mr. Gert Arens.

As for the police, who according to the huge number of persons speaking at the meeting in Kuceviste are blacker than the blackest devil, they reacted in all cases in which the integrity and sovereignty of the country were violated, and they were subjected to a barrage of curses. A very routine, trivial, and ordinary intervention is characterized as an attack against an ethnic group and as a violation of ethnic dignity. This does not mean that the police are free of responsibility for the use of force. The laws of the country that the police protect also apply to them. Unfortunately, to all appearances, and despite the statement by their representatives to PULS several months ago that "the police will not allow themselves to be provoked," the Kuceviste incident is the best example of contradiction of this statement. The weakest link in the chain of democracy in Macedonia could be the inflexibility of the police and their participation in interethnic relations or police actions that might create an overheated atmosphere in this sensitive area of communal life.

But the tension has unquestionably been increased primarily by the acts of extremism such as the demands for so-called brotherly help from Serbia, the chants that "this is Serbia here," the awakening of old ill feelings in the Montenegrin element in Skopje by the propaganda statements that the people are divided into Serbs and Bulgarians

(according to these statements there are no Macedonians), the instilling of hatred by statements by people such as Neskovic (the best known naturalized Serb in Macedonia), the image of the young people in Kumanovo and Skopje in tears complaining in public of the alleged misdeeds of the gendarmerie, and the provocative statement that "if they want war, they will have war."

Macedonia is a sovereign and independent country. This is an inescapable fact regardless of the hypersensitivity of the Serbian nationalists about their unrealized dreams of a Vardar province in a Greater Serbia. Accordingly this folklore, however much it may have been generated by the atmosphere of political meetings, is moving the DPS and its leaders from assertions about the autonomy and indigenous nature of the party, the civil and democratic platform, and readiness for dialogue. Probably the most typical in this entire situation are two statements. One was made by Mirjana Jovicic-Smileva at the news conference at which she said "We are citizens of this country. These people (DPS leaders, Ristic-Tomic) cannot be protected by pictures of Arkan, Seselj, and Milosevic." The other one was made by an older person attending the meeting in Kuceviste, one whose occupation was clearly to be seen from the condition of his hands. He listened closely to everything that was said on the stage, and at one point, observing notes being taken down by a newspaperman, said, "do not write everything down. Skip over the stupid remarks being made."

There is no Serbian paranoia in Macedonia, but we must not be politically naive and fail to notice that an attempt is being made by Serbia, or rather by extreme nationalist individuals or political parties, to push through a tragic policy of Milosevic that is already passe and has failed. It would be very stupid to use these nebulous aspirations to manipulate people, especially young people, and commit another political absurdity. As an ancient Chinese proverb says, "an absurdity never remains single." Absurdity such as this is constantly promoted in the region of former Yugoslavia.

* Food on Black Market in Macedonia

93BA0579A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 28 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by B. Dichevska: "Black Market in Food—Poison in a Plate"]

[Text] *Greater control of imported food products in the Republic.*

What is happening at the present time with the import of livestock, meat, dried meat products, milk, different milk preparations, and so forth, is nothing other than illicit trading and legalization of the black market in food. Potential danger of expansion of different diseases of animal origin.

"Macedonia does not need a war. It will eliminate itself by importing food." This statement that the director of "Stokopromet," Mirko Lekoski, made to an official meeting in the Chamber, refers to a serious condition that exists in the market for food products in the Republic. More precisely, a situation that requires more diligent legal measures on the part of the government and introducing greater monitoring of imported products on the part of its executive agencies.

Illegal Trading

As Lekoski emphasized in the discussions later, whatever is being done with imports of livestock, meat, dried meat products, different milk preparations, cheese, kashkaval [Bulgarian yellow cheese], and so forth cannot be interpreted as anything other than a mass extension and legalization of the black market in food. He says that you don't have to do a lot of investigation to determine the reliability of this statement, the open air markets in Skopje with heaps of meat pushed out for sale along the counters and along the sidewalk around them, the displayed cakes of kashkaval, cheese molds, milk, large scale sales of livestock at livestock markets, and whatever else are a sufficient illustration of the reliability of this statement. And all this is displayed and sold before the eyes of the inspectors, the police of other executive agencies of the government, literally before the eyes of all of us. In addition, by every indication, nothing is being done to eliminate this illegal trading in the basic food products, so it appears that everyday there is a tendency for this to expand through the other markets in the Republic.

In fact, no one is against imports, and even less, again, against the market placement of more inexpensive food. However, we are for imports that will represent intervention in the shortage of corresponding food products, the implementation of which will be regulated exclusively by previously issued certificates of origin and of the sanitary condition of the imported goods and by other documents issued for import rights. And, what is more important, the imported goods must correspond to the appropriate standards which actually exist on the market in the European community. Unfortunately, in our country, many practical examples have shown that things take place more at random than by the development of legal regulations, which will contain all instructions, standards, and criteria for regular imports in accordance with established standards.

What is happening is not because of ignorance or inability, but, first of all, because of the irresponsible and comfortable relation of the government toward the timely codification and submission of these kinds of legal measures.

Danger From Infectious Diseases

We do not expect all this to be done overnight. However, the correct application of the already existing Yugoslav standards should be taken into account, especially in the case of a long-term absence of established Macedonian standards for importing goods. As Kiro Dokuzovski emphasized, it cannot be maintained with certainty that no examples of uncontrolled imports will be recorded if the Yugoslav standards are used; however, they would be fairly effective in overcoming the current chaos in the market for meat, milk, livestock, and so forth. Now, everyone imports from where ever they find things and whatever they can find. And the greatest danger is that the bulk of the imports are from Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, and so forth, that is, from where it is the fastest and easiest. However, in Bulgaria, for example, rinderpest was prevalent in nine regions. And even in the case of these conditions, and still more in the case of the present imports of livestock from Albania, which is sold on the livestock market in Trubarevo and in other places,

"currency has to rule"—the people will eat more cheaply.... Shouldn't we be concerned about the dangers that can occur with the large scale expansion and transmission of diseases from cattle among the population such as the ligavka [disease of mucous membrane], hoof-in-mouth disease, rinderpest, and others. With respect to what is done concerning the basic food products that are consumed everyday, it is not by accident that we insist that measures be taken to do away with the present so-called illicit trading and black market in food as soon as possible. What is more, we are for complete monitoring of every shipment which is brought into the Republic, irrespective of the country from which it is imported.

What Is Wrong Is Thrown Away

While employees from the market complex point out the weaknesses of the uncontrolled imports and insist that standards be confirmed as soon as possible and in general insist on complete legal regulation in this regard, the responsible authorities have opposite ideas and statements. More specifically, that everything is regulated by issuing certificates and monitoring of imported goods. As *Aleksandar Naletovski*, the director of the Republic Administration for Veterinary Science of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Resources, emphasizes, importation of livestock products, especially of livestock and meat, takes place

exclusively with issued certificates and other required documentation. Veterinary inspectors monitor the state of health and quality. Monitoring of this type with the presence of a veterinarian inspector is performed at border crossings for cattle, and specimens are brought to the Institute for Veterinary Science in Skopje. Improper goods are turned back. Thus, so far, shipments of livestock from Bulgaria and from the Czech Republic have been turned back; likewise a shipment of spoiled milk was turned back from Bulgaria, and a shipment of ground meat from Denmark. On the average, 500 to 1,000 kg of meat and 300 to 500 kg of dried meat products are confiscated every week. Products are also monitored; nevertheless, there are cases where samples of kashkaval have been sent for testing to the Institute and starch was found. However, such goods are sanitary and not dangerous for the human organism. These are deceptions that are carried out in the production facilities of the exporting country.

For the time being, the only hard thing is to stop the chaotic situation of the sale of meat in the open air markets. These goods are not transported through the established border crossings but through different other channels. Therefore, most of this meat comes from Serbia. However, Naletovski adds, this is more a responsibility of the market inspection services and of the corresponding police services.

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